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INTRODUCTION
Several witnesses stated that during the atrocities “the Rwandese
carried a radio set in one hand and a machete in the other.”. . .The
radio was a powerful tool for the dissemination of ethnic hatred.
Radio National and RTLM freely and regularly broadcasted ethnic
hatred against the Tutsis.1
During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, observers emphasized the role
of media propaganda in inciting Rwandan Hutus to attack the Tutsi minor-
ity group, with one claiming that the primary tools of genocide were “the
radio and the machete.”2 As a steady stream of commentators3 referred to
“radio genocide” and “death by radio” and “the soundtrack to genocide,”
a widespread consensus emerged that key responsibility for the genocide
lay with the Rwandan media.4 Mathias Ruzindana, prosecution expert wit-
ness at the ICTR, supports this notion, writing, “In the case of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, the effect of language was lethal . . .  hate media . . .
played a key role in the instigation of genocide.”5 Legal precedents from
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) solidified this
view as doctrine, finding that certain public statements by Hutu political
leaders and RTLM radio broadcasts constituted direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide against ethnic Tutsis.6
1. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 280
(May 21, 1999).
2. JEAN-PIERRE CHRÉTIEN ET AL., RWANDA: LES MÉDIAS DU GÉNOCIDE 191 (1995).
3. Scott Straus documents numerous instances of the “genocide by radio” theory.
Scott Straus, What Is the Relationship Between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking
Rwanda’s ‘Radio Machete’, 35 POL. & SOC’Y 609, 612–13 (2007). A number of scholars have
reproduced this language, including Justin La Mort and Darryl Li. See Justin La Mort, The
Soundtrack to Genocide: Using Incitement to Genocide in the Bikindi Trial to Protect Free
Speech and Uphold the Promise of Never Again, 4 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 43, 50–51
(2009) (describing the “media trial” of three Hutu leaders and their  participation in “Radio
Machete” that “broadcast names and directions of Tutsi and Hutu political opponents who
were subsequently killed” and “relentlessly sent the message ‘the Tutsi were the enemy and
had to be eliminated once and for all.’); Darryl Li, Echoes of Violence: Considerations on
Radio and Genocide in Rwanda, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 9 (2004) (discussing the role that Radio-
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) played in the Rwandan genocide).
4. NEIL J. MITCHELL, AGENTS OF ATROCITY: LEADERS, FOLLOWERS AND THE VIO-
LATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CIVIL WAR (2004); Francois Misser & Yves Jaumain, Death by
Radio, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 72 (1994).
5. Mathias Ruzindana, The Challenges of Understanding Kinyarwanda Key Terms
Used to Instigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, in PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM SPEAKERS’ CORNER TO WAR CRIMES 145, 145 (Predrag Dojči-
novićed., 2012).
6. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence, ¶¶ 1366–69 (Dec. 20, 2012); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 422–26 (Dec. 2, 2008); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 966–969, 1033–39 (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judg-
ment and Sentence, ¶¶ 430–37 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-
I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 44–45, § IV (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No.
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Recognition of incitement to commit genocide under international
criminal law is not confined to the ICTR. International criminal tribunals
have accorded great weight to the role of propaganda as they sought to
understand the origins and causes of armed conflict. As at the Nuremberg
trials of 1945–46, propaganda became one of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (“ICTY”) overarching explanations
for why neighbors became killers during the 1991–95 conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. The ICTY charged defendants such as Dario Kordić and
Radoslav Br–danin with complicity to commit genocide—in part on the ba-
sis of evidence from their public speeches.7 At other ICTY trials, prosecu-
tors cited speeches and propagandistic broadcasts as evidence of
defendants’ participation in a joint criminal enterprise to commit crimes
against humanity.8 For instance, the Trial Chamber in Br–danin identified
propaganda as a primary driver of the Balkans conflict:
Prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict, the SDS [Serbian
Democratic Party] started waging a propaganda war which had a
disastrous impact on the people of all ethnicities, creating mutual
fear and hatred and particularly inciting the Bosnian Serb popula-
tion against the other ethnicities. Within a short period of time,
citizens who had previously lived together peacefully became ene-
mies and many of them, in the present case mainly Bosnian Serbs,
became killers, influenced by a media, which by that time, was
already under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership.9
ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 39(v)–(vii),(x), 40(3) (Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 673–75 (Sept. 2, 1998).
7. Both defendants were acquitted of any liability for crimes against humanity on the
basis of their speeches. Prosecutor v. Br_d;anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004).
8. Br–danin, IT-99-36-T, ¶¶ 80, 323–32. See also Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No.
IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1812–1821 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10,
2010) (describing the role of Milan Gvero, Assistant Commander for Morale of the Bosnian
Serb Army, in the widespread promotion and dissemination of propaganda); Prosecutor v.
Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Third Amended Indictment, ¶ 14(c) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2009) (“Disseminating, encouraging, and/or facilitating the
dissemination of propaganda to Bosnian Serbs intended to engender in Bosnian Serbs fear
and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats or to otherwise win support for and
participation in achieving the objective of the joint criminal enterprise.”); Prosecutor v.
Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Third Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 5, 10(b) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007) (alleging that Šešelj participated in a joint criminal enter-
prise by making “inflammatory speeches in the media, during public events, and during visits
to the volunteer units . . . instigating those forces to commit crimes. . . .”). For a discussion on
incitement and the poetry of Radovan Karadžić, see also Jay Surdukowski, Note, Is Poetry a
War Crime? Reckoning for Radovan Karadžić the Poet-Warrior, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673
(2005).
9. Br–danin, IT-99-36-7, ¶ 80. See Nidzara Ahmetasević, Hague Recognizes Propa-
ganda’s Role in Srebrenica Genocide, BALKAN INSIGHT (July 7, 2010, 12:55:23 PM), http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hague-recognises-propaganda-s-role-in-srebrenica-geno
cide (describing the ICTY’s judgment against Gvero for the role he played, by using propa-
ganda, in the joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica area of eastern
Bosnia); see also Prosecutor v. Miloševic, Case No. IT-02-54, Ex. 446 (Mar. 14, 2006) (report
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Over the last decade, this trend has continued unabated: international
criminal courts have increasingly targeted public speech that incites inter-
group violence.10 For example, since its founding in 2002, the International
Criminal Court has issued warrants of arrest against four individuals
(Ahmad Harun, Callixte Mbarushimana, William Ruto and Joshua arap
Sang) charged with ordering, inducing or co-perpetrating war crimes and
crimes against humanity during speeches or radio broadcasts.11 As inter-
national tribunals target speech crimes with ever more alacrity, one legal
scholar advocates extending the scope of international law to encompass a
new atrocity speech offense: “incitement to commit war crimes.”12
The ICTR’s decisions on direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide (hereafter, “ICG”) exhibit some contradictory elements that warrant
further attention. ICG is an inchoate crime under international criminal
law: its underlying intended crime (in this case, genocide) need not actu-
ally occur for the crime to be proven. It should follow, therefore, that to
prove ICG, prosecutors need not show a causal link between a speech act
and subsequent genocidal acts. Demonstrating that a speech, broadcast, or
by expert witness, Renaud de La Brosse entitled “Political Propaganda and a Plan to Create
a ‘State for All Serbs’: Consequences of Using the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends”).
10. For discussions on the growing criminalization of propaganda in international law,
see MICHAEL G. KEARNY, THE PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2007); Susan Benesch, The Ghost of Causation in International Speech Crime Cases, in
PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 254 [herein-
after Benesch, Ghost of Causation]; Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining
Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485 (2008) [hereinafter Benesch, Vile Crime];
Gregory S. Gordon, Formulating a New Atrocity Speech Offense: Incitement to Commit War
Crimes, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281 (2012) [hereinafter Gordon, New Atrocity Speech Offense];
Gregory S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and Nonvi-
olence in Incitement Law, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607 (2010) [hereinafter Gordon, Music
and Genocide]; Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran’s Presi-
dent for Advocating Israel’s Destruction and Piecing Together Incitement Law’s Emerging
Analytical Framework, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon,
From Incitement to Indictment?]; Wibke Kristin Timmerman, Incitement in International
Criminal Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 823 (2006) [hereinafter Timmerman, Incitement];
Wibke Kristin Timmerman, The Relationship Between Hate Propaganda and Incitement to
Genocide: A New Trend in International Law Towards Criminalization of Hate Propaganda,
18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 257 (2005) [hereinafter Timmerman, Relationship Between Hate Propa-
ganda]. With regard to domestic jurisdictions, see Mugesera v. Canada, which issued a depor-
tation order based on a speech made by the defendant in Rwanda in 1992 that the court
deemed incitement to commit genocide. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.). In England and Wales, the Racial and
Religious Hatred Act makes it an offense to incite hatred against a person on the grounds of
his or her religion. Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, 2006, c. 1 (Eng. & Wales).
11. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang,
Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 363–67 (Jan. 23, 2012); Prosecutor v. Callixte
Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Dec.
16, 2011), Section VII.3.b., §304–315; Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun & Ali
Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27,
2007).
12. Gordon, New Atrocity Speech Offense, supra note 10, at 301–07.
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publication represented a public and direct call to exterminate a protected
group ought to be sufficient to establish criminal responsibility for ICG.
Nonetheless, ICTR judges have repeatedly advanced robust claims about
the direct, causal relationship between speeches and media broadcasts and
subsequent public violence in their factual findings on the Rwandan geno-
cide. Moreover, some judgments refer to causation in their legal analysis
and suggest that causation may be a necessary element in the legal doc-
trine of  ICG. Such a move constitutes a radical departure from at least a
century of the criminal law of inchoate crimes.
This Article examines the framework of criminal accountability for di-
rect and public incitement to commit genocide and critically evaluates the
claim made in ICTR Trial Chamber judgments that a causal connection
exists between propagandistic speech acts and genocidal acts of violence.
Parts I and II track and evaluate the development of international juris-
prudence on propaganda in the context of domestic and international
armed conflict, from the Nuremberg Trials to the ICTR judgments. Part II
also questions the place of causation in ICTR jurisprudence and under-
lines the ambiguities in contemporary legal reasoning on ICG. Part III
then critiques the “likelihood of genocide” matrix developed by Susan Be-
nesch, finding that while Benesch’s approach is valuable in its attention to
the context of speech acts, additional intellectual groundwork is needed:
first, to establish the formal legal basis for inchoate speech crimes such as
ICG, and second, to separate such inchoate crimes from other modes of
international legal liability for speech acts in connection with crimes.13
Next, drawing upon the theoretical framework of one of the foremost phi-
losophers of language in the twentieth century, J.L. Austin, Parts IV and V
disentangle the intention of the speaker from the consequences of speech
acts. Part IV explains Austin’s theory, drawing on it to recommend re-
forms to ICG jurisprudence. In determining incitement to commit geno-
cide, international law might usefully differentiate between three aspects
of performative utterances, or what Austin terms the “locutionary” (the
meaning and content), “illocutionary” (its force), and “perlocutionary”
(the consequences) qualities of speech acts.14 Specific intent to commit
genocide is found in the content, meaning, and force of speech acts, rather
than in consequences, which can be an unreliable guide to intention. Part
V finds that by using this template, international tribunals might better
distinguish modes of liability that require causation (such as instigating,
ordering, and aiding and abetting) from inchoate crimes such as direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, where the meaning and the force of
public statements—rather than their consequences—is paramount. Other
benefits of this approach would include refocusing attention on the pre-
vention of genocide and clarifying and narrowing the range of impermissi-
ble speech.
13. See Benesch, The Ghost of Causation in International Speech Crime Cases, supra
note 10.
14. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 94–101 (1975).
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I. EARLY JURISPRUDENCE: AVOIDING EXPLICIT
THEORIES OF CAUSATION
A large number of the ordinary members of the German nation
would never have participated in or tolerated the atrocities commit-
ted throughout Europe if they had not been conditioned to barba-
rous convictions and misconceptions by the constant grinding of
the Nazi propaganda machine.
Captain D.A. Sprecher15
Before delving into recent international jurisprudence on speech
crimes, it is worth noting the elements of U.S. law that have influenced
international thinking on this issue. U.S. constitutional law places well-
known legal protections on freedom of speech, but there is also a fairly
long tradition of First Amendment jurisprudence that limits violent speech
and “‘fighting’ words” that “by their very utterance inflict injury.”16 The
enduring incitement case in U.S. law is Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), which
dealt with a Ku Klux Klan leader in Ohio (Clarence Brandenburg) whom
a trial court fined $1000 and sentenced to one to ten years’ imprisonment
for inciting violence against African-Americans and Jews at a public tele-
vised rally in 1964.17 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s
conviction, noting that while his speech was “derogatory,” it merely advo-
cated vague and abstract measures and did not represent incitement to
“imminent lawless action.”18 On its own, mere advocacy of force or vio-
lence is not prohibited under U.S. law. Under the Brandenburg test, public
speech does not warrant First Amendment protection when three criteria
are met: 1) the speech is intended to incite violence or lawlessness; 2) it “is
likely to incite . . . such action”; and 3) such lawlessness is likely to occur
imminently.19 A number of issues remain unresolved, however, and Healy
notes that Brandenburg “does not tell us how likely it must be that speech
will lead to unlawful conduct or how imminent that conduct must be.”20
U.S. law warrants a mention here because elements of the judicial reason-
ing found in Brandenburg, and the gray areas surrounding likelihood and
imminence, resurface later in the international criminal law of incitement.
15. Thomas J. Dodd, Prosecution Oral Presentation Against Fritzsche, University of
Connecticut: Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, availa-
ble at http://archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002:1536#page/1/mode/2up.
16. Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
17. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–46 (1969).
18. Id. at 446, 448–49. Up until that point, the standard had been the “clear and pre-
sent danger” test of the Schenck decision (1919). Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919).
19. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
20. Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655,
660 (2009). For more discussion of the complexities of Brandenburg jurisprudence, see
Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 971 (2010).
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In international criminal law, responsibility for propaganda and vio-
lent speech was first established in 1945–46 at the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in the Streicher case.21 Founder and pub-
lisher of Der Stürmer, a vicious anti-Semitic German weekly, Julius
Streicher was convicted in 1946 of “persecution on political and racial
grounds in connection with war crimes,” punishable as a crime against hu-
manity under the IMT Charter.22 Streicher’s case was exceptional in that
he was the only defendant convicted and executed at Nuremberg solely on
Count Four of Crimes Against Humanity. The Tribunal justified its sen-
tence by finding that the defendant had knowledge of Hitler’s policy of
extermination of the Jews, yet he continued to incite Germans “to murder
and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed
under the most horrible conditions.”23 Nevertheless, the fleeting, almost
cursory decision failed to settle unambiguously the nature of Streicher’s
liability. Nor, according to Margaret Eastwood, did it “specifically define
the mens rea necessary for an act of incitement to genocide.”24
It is instructive to consider the grounds on which Nuremberg prosecu-
tors sought to convict two Nazi propagandists for crimes against humanity,
when no precedent existed in international law. We can learn a great deal
about prosecutors’ strategizing in 1945–46 from the trial briefs and memo-
randa held in the archives of Thomas J. Dodd, executive trial counsel at
Nuremberg. Dodd’s papers reveal that the prosecution held the two prop-
aganda defendants—Streicher and Hans Fritzsche25—liable for crimes
against humanity as accessories or abettors who incited and encouraged
others. Pre-trial briefs refer to Fritzsche as “a principal conspirator in
abetting aggressive wars,” whose actions “create[d] in the German people
the requisite psychological and political conditions for aggressive war.”26
His noteworthy role was “preparing Nazi Germany for aggressive war and
for the barbarities committed by the Nazis both within Germany and
abroad.”27 Similarly, the prosecutors’ brief on Streicher stated that
“[d]efendant Streicher is an accessory to the persecution of the Jews
21. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J.
INT’L L. 172, 296 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences].
See also Jens David Ohlin, Incitement and Conspiracy to Commit Genocide, in THE U.N.
GENOCIDE CONVENTION– A COMMENTARY 207, 210 (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009).
22. Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences, at 294–96, 331.
23. Id. at 295–96, 333.
24. Margaret Eastwood, Hitler’s Notorious Jew-Baiter: The Prosecution of Julius
Streicher, in PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5 at
203, 220.
25. Hans Fritzsche was Head of the German Home Press Department and number
two to Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels. Fritzsche was acquitted on all counts by the
Tribunal. Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences at 327–29.
26. Thomas J. Dodd, The Individual Responsibility of the Defendant Hans Fritzsche,
University of Connecticut: Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research
Center, available at http://archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1529#page/5/
mode/2up.
27. Id.
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within Germany and in occupied territories . . . [who] actively supported,
recommended, and promoted the program of extermination.”28 In an in-
terview some twenty years after the Nuremberg trials, British prosecutor
Mervyn Griffith-Jones29 confirmed that the prosecution’s case against
Streicher rested upon his involvement as an accessory to genocide;
Streicher’s incitement and encouragement of a policy of extermination of
the Jews made him “a party to the murder of millions of people.”30
U.S. prosecutors at Nuremberg, meanwhile, consciously avoided intro-
ducing any causation arguments into their propaganda cases. For example,
they forswore leading evidence of a court record of the trial of a member
of the Sturm Abteilung, or “Stormtroopers,” for the 1934 murder of a Jew,
in which the defendant testified that his act was incited by a story about
ritual murder published in Der Stürmer.31 The prosecution team antici-
pated Streicher’s defense rejoinder that no direct evidence had been intro-
duced to prove that his propaganda did, in fact, influence those directly
participating in persecution or extermination by reminding the Tribunal
that causation was “tangential to the charge brought against Streicher.”32
Instead, prosecutors concentrated the courtroom’s attention on the ex-
plicit message contained in Julius Streicher’s words themselves. Here, the
primary prosecution exhibit was the May 1939 issue of Der Stürmer, in
which Streicher declared, “The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must
be exterminated root and branch.”33
Prosecutors also focused on the mental states of the propagandist and
the German population, noting that Streicher “incited a fear and hatred of
Jews which made persecution in the first instance, and finally, the program
of mass murder which he openly advocated, a psychological possibility.”34
While the prosecution refrained from claiming that Streicher’s propaganda
caused genocide, time and time again it referred to how it prepared the
28. Thomas J. Dodd, The Individual Responsibility of the Defendant Hans Fritzsche,
University of Connecticut: Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research
Center, available at http://archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1942#page/1/
mode/2up.
29. As an historic figure, Griffith-Jones is (in)famous for prosecuting Penguin books
for publishing D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960. Richard Vinen, Servant
Problems, 5 HISTORICALLY SPEAKING 2, 2–5 (2003), available at http://www.bu.edu/historic/
hs/november03.html#vinen.
30. Eastwood, supra note 24, at 220.
31. Thomas J. Dodd, Defense of Streicher, University of Connecticut: Archives & Spe-
cial Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, available at http://archives.lib.uconn
.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1953#page/1/mode/2up; Thomas J. Dodd, Office of U.S.
Chief of Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Dodd, University of Connecticut: Archives & Special
Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center (May 29, 1946), available at http://
archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1953#page/1/mode/2up.
32. Thomas J. Dodd, Individual Responsibility of the Defendant Julius Streicher, Uni-
versity of Connecticut: Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research
Center, available at http://archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1942#page/1/
mode/2up.
33. Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences, at 295.
34. See Individual Responsibility of the Defendant Julius Streicher, supra note 32.
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ground psychologically and rendered mass crimes thinkable. A May 1946
memo of from Harriet Zetterberg Margolies to fellow prosecutor Dodd
lays out the prosecution’s case theory: “Streicher helped to create, through
his propaganda, the psychological basis necessary for carrying through a
program of persecution which culminated in the murder of six million
men, women, and children.”35 Captain Drexel Sprecher’s oral presenta-
tion to the courtroom likewise asserted that Fritzsche’s inciting remarks
“helped fashion the psychological atmosphere of utter and complete un-
reason and hatred.”36
Nuremberg judges followed the prosecution’s lead in the Streicher de-
cision, converging on the psychology and mental states of the German
populace. They eschewed identifying a specific causal connection between
Streicher’s speeches or publications and any particular criminal acts, but
rather emphasized the relationship between his propaganda and the
broader anti-Semitic mindset of Germans: “In his speeches and articles,
week after week, month after month, [Streicher] infected the German
mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to
active persecution.”37 Therefore the IMT decision postulated a connec-
tion, not between the defendant’s acts and concrete genocidal acts, but
between the defendant’s acts and the minds of other Germans, through
the metaphor of viral contagion. The IMT’s commentary on the matter
was spare and the entire decision was barely two pages, but the ICTR Trial
Chamber later recognized that “the judgment does not explicitly note a
direct causal link between Streicher’s publication and any specific acts of
murder.”38 In sum, both prosecutors and judges constructed Streicher’s
criminal responsibility upon accomplice liability, and upon intention and
psychological states, rather than causation and a demonstrable nexus be-
tween propaganda and particular material crimes.
In the aftermath of Nuremberg, on December 9, 1948, the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“UN Genocide Convention”),
which in Article III(c) declared “direct and public incitement to commit
genocide” an international crime.39
Given the brevity of judicial commentary in Streicher and the dearth
of ICG cases in international courts for nearly a half century after Nurem-
berg, the ICTR—established in 1994—had little jurisprudence to guide its
35. Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel Memorandum for Mr. Dodd, supra note 31, at 1.
36. Prosecution Oral Presentation Against Fritzsche, supra note 15, at 23.
37. Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences, at 294. On the trial of Streicher, see East-
wood, supra note 24, at 203; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRI-
ALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 376–80 (1992).
38. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 981 (Dec. 3,
2003).
39. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3(c),
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
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reasoning on the role of propaganda in the Rwandan genocide.40 What
little direction existed on how to interpret Article III(c) of the UN Geno-
cide Convention lay in the Report of the International Law Commission’s
forty-eighth session in 1996, during which the Commission drafted a non-
binding “Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.”41
Rupturing with domestic criminal codes as well as the precedent set at
Nuremberg, the International Law Commission stipulated that direct and
public incitement “is limited to situations in which the other individual
actually commits that crime.”42 According to the 1996 Code, criminal re-
sponsibility only applies when an individual “directly and publicly incites
another individual to commit such a crime which in fact occurs (my
emphasis).”43
William Schabas is justifiably critical of the International Law Com-
mission’s formulation, which he says “revealed a serious misunderstand-
ing” and “obviously departed from the spirit of article III(c)” by requiring
the underlying crime to be consummated.44 I would venture a step further
and argue that the fragility of the ICTR’s jurisprudence on incitement
originates in the defective guidance in the International Law Commis-
sion’s 1996 Code, which restricted the crime of direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide to instances in which the crime of genocide
actually occurs.45 That ICTR Trial Chamber judges were influenced by the
ILC’s 1996 Code is apparent: they cite it approvingly in nearly all the in-
citement decisions, starting with the Tribunal’s very first case, that of Jean-
Paul Akayesu.46
40. The ICTR was established on November 8, 1994 by UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 955. S.C. Res. 955, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
41. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Secur-
ity of Mankind, 48th Sess., July 17, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532; U.N. GAOR 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, art. 2.3(f), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 17.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. art. 2.3(f).
44. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES
324 (2d ed. 2009).
45. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 41.
46. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 475, 556, 587 (Sept.
2, 1998). See also Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, ¶ 387, 96 n.867
(Dec. 2, 2008); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal,
¶ 1011 (Nov. 28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sen-
tence, ¶ 17 (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 87, 95, 229 (May 21, 1999). This flawed legal formulation could have travelled
from the International Law Commission to the international criminal tribunals in various
ways, including through a transfer of personnel, since at least one Commissioner (Patrick L.
Robinson) participating in the 1996 session later became an ICTY judge in 1998 and ICTY
President in 2008. Former Presidents, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBU-
NAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/155 (last visited
Nov. 21, 2014).
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II. DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
This Part reviews the ICTR’s groundbreaking case law on direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, the first application of the UN Ge-
nocide Convention’s incitement provisions by an international criminal tri-
bunal. This Part focuses on one key aspect of this jurisprudence: the
prominent and ambiguous role of causation in the Tribunal’s incitement
rulings. In reviewing the applicable law, the rulings tend to reiterate the
standard legal formulation that as an inchoate crime, ICG may occur re-
gardless of the consequences of a speech or broadcast. Nevertheless, as
this Article discusses in greater detail below, a number of the initial ICTR
judgments advanced in their findings of fact a clear causal link between
speeches or broadcasts and actual genocide or other material crimes. Sub-
sequent ICTR rulings went even further, and references to causation
seeped into their legal findings and altered the way in which the ICTR
Trial Chamber conceptualized the legal contours of incitement. Reviewing
the entire corpus of ICTR case law in incitement to commit genocide, one
might reasonably ask whether the ICTR judges’ attention to causation in
adjudicating ICG has elevated it to the level of a requisite element of the
crime. Reasonable grounds exist for and against the proposition, but both
sides could agree that the successive trial and appeal rulings contain a
great deal of ambiguity and conflicting language.
A. Explicit Causality Analysis in Akayesu
In its very first case, in 1998, the ICTR confronted a defendant
charged with direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The Trial
Chamber convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) of the ICTR Statute.47 The Trial
Chamber verdict in Akayesu contained a novel aspect that distinguished it
from Streicher, namely its explicit claims about the causal effects of incit-
ing speech. In its legal findings, the Trial Chamber formally confirmed the
accepted legal position that ICG is an inchoate crime that can be com-
pleted “regardless of the result achieved.”48 In its factual findings section,
however, the Trial Chamber asserted conspicuously the causal effects of
one of Akayesu’s inciting speeches: “The Chamber is of the opinion that
there is a causal relationship between Akayesu’s speeches at the gathering
of 19 April 1994 and the ensuing widespread massacres of Tutsi in Taba.”49
The three international judges saw it as noteworthy that Akayesu’s call to
arms “was indeed successful and did lead to the destruction of a great
number of Tutsi in the commune of Taba.”50
One plausible explanation is that the Akayesu court introduced causa-
tion as a way of shoring up the “directness” aspect of the conviction of the
47. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, at ¶¶ 674–75.
48. Id. ¶ 562.
49. Id. ¶ 673(vii).
50. Id. ¶ 675.
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accused for direct and public incitement. Given the euphemistic and coded
speech of the defendant, the prosecution was not able to present evidence
against Akayesu as clear and direct as Streicher’s exhortations, such as:
“The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated root and
branch.”51 In order to conclude that Akayesu directly incited his followers
to commit genocide, the judges in Akayesu were compelled to adopt an
expansive view that encompassed implicit as well as explicit calls to exter-
minate a protected group. The Akayesu Trial Chamber based its under-
standing of the cultural meaning of speeches on the report, relying heavily
on the testimony of Dr. Mathias Ruzindana, the prosecution’s expert wit-
ness on Kinyarwanda linguistics.52 The Trial Chamber found that
Akayesu’s exhortations to fight “the Inkotanyi” (literally “warriors”) to a
crowd of 100 people at Gishyeshye in the early hours of April 19, 1994
“would be construed as a call to kill the Tutsi in general.”53 Akayesu’s
capacious interpretation of euphemistic calls to genocide set a precedent
that the Trial Chamber would enlarge in later cases such as Ruggiu, where
it stated that “the term ‘Inyenzi’ [“cockroach”] became synonymous with
the term ‘Tutsi.’”54 Over time, the Tribunal came to interpret a defen-
dant’s use of the expression “go to work” to mean, “[G]o kill the Tutsis
and Hutu political opponents of the interim government.”55 It appears
that the Trial Chamber made its repeated causal declarations in order to
justify the inclusion of euphemistic speech within the “directness” require-
ment of the crime of ICG.
Akayesu’s treatment of causation went beyond merely fulfilling the
directness requirement of ICG, however. The judgment seemingly ele-
vated causation to a legal requirement to prove incitement, even though
the Trial Chamber embedded its pronouncement in the factual findings
section of the decision: “the Chamber feels that it is not sufficient to sim-
ply establish a possible coincidence between the Gishyeshye meeting and
the beginning of the killing of Tutsi in Taba, but that there must be proof of
a possible causal link between the statement made by the Accused during
the said meeting and the beginning of the killings” (emphasis in origi-
51. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 303 (1947).
52. For a summary of the expert witness report, see Ruzindana, supra note 5, at 145,
145–70.
53. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 673(iv) (Sept. 2,
1998). The judgment notes that “Inkotanyi” means literally “warriors,” and was a term com-
monly used to refer to soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Id. ¶ 147. Furthermore, “In-
kotanyi” has pre-colonial origins and in that period had no mono-ethnic connotations. The
judgment glosses the use of the term in 1994 thus: “it should be assumed that the basic mean-
ing of the term Inkotanyi is the RPF army.” Id. The official website of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front still proclaims “Inkotanyi” beneath its homepage banner headline. RWANDAN PATRI-
OTIC FRONT, http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/index.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
54. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44(iii)
(June 1, 2000).
55. Id. at ¶ 44(iv).
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nal).56 This demand for proof ostensibly removed ICG from the category
of inchoate crimes and re-categorized it among forms of criminal liability
(such as ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting) that require actual
commission of the underlying crime.57
B. The Nahimana Trial Chamber’s Incoherent Jurisprudence
Subsequent ICG trials at the ICTR referred to and amplified the
causal element introduced in Akayesu, even as they simultaneously reiter-
ated the inchoate nature of the crime. The judgment that gave greatest
prominence to the causal effects of speech acts was Prosecutor v. Ferdi-
nand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwisa, Hassan Ngeze.58 International
legal scholar Diane Orentlicher called Nahimana, also known as the “Me-
dia Trial,” “the most important judgment relating to the law of incitement
in the context of international criminal law since the judgment at Nurem-
berg more than fifty-seven years earlier.”59
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: the three defendants in the
Media Trial all owned major Rwandan media outlets. Ferdinand
Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwisa were both government ministers
and founders of the main independent radio station Radio Télévision
Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM). Hassan Ngeze was the owner and edi-
tor of Kangura,60 a newspaper widely distributed in Rwanda before the
genocide.61 Surprisingly, all three were convicted of direct commission of
genocide as a result of their leadership positions at RTLM and Kangura
and their responsibility for publications and radio broadcasts. The Trial
56. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T ¶ 349 (emphasis added).
57. ANTONIO CASSESE & PAOLA GAETA, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
193 – 205 (3rd ed. 2013) (indicating that each of the modes of liability listed here require the
commission of the crime, that is, they are not inchoate crimes like incitement to commit
genocide) [hereinafter CASSESE & GAETA)].
58. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment (Dec. 3, 2003).
For legal commentary on the Media Trial, see Susan Benesch, Inciting Genocide, Inciting Free
Speech, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 62 (2004) [hereinafter Benesch, Inciting Genocide]; Benesch, Vile
Crime, supra note 10; H. Ron Davidson, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s
Decision in The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., The Past, Present, and Future of
International Incitement Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 505 (2004); Gordon, New Atrocity Speech
Offense, supra note 10; Gordon, Music and Genocide, supra note 10; Gregory S. Gordon, A
War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations: The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a
New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 139 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Gordon, War of Media]; Catharine A. Mackinnon, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza,
and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 98 AMER. J. INT’L L. 325 (2009); Christopher Scott
Maravilla, Hate Speech as a War Crime: Public and Direct Incitement to Genocide in Interna-
tional Law, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113 (2009); Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate
Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 17
(2005); Alexander Zahar, The ICTR’s “Media” Judgment and the Reinvention of Direct and
Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, 16 CRIM. L.F. 33 (2005).
59. Orentlicher, supra note 58, at 17.
60. Which according to the glossary in the Nahimana Judgment literally means “wake
others up.”
61. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 7, 10.
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Chamber defended this conviction on the grounds that “[e]ditors and pub-
lishers have generally been held responsible for the media they control.”62
As Orentlicher explains: “the trial chamber in effect treated Kangura and
RTLM themselves as perpetrators of genocide and convicted the defend-
ants by virtue of their relationship to the media organs in question.”63
The three defendants in the Media Trial were also convicted of ICG,
in a verdict that asserted a clear causal connection between speeches and
radio broadcasts and subsequent public violence. The ruling asserts no less
than sixteen times that speech acts directly caused genocidal killings, using
language such as:
Many of the individuals specifically named in RTLM broadcasts
after 6 April 1994 were subsequently killed. . . While the extent of
causation by RTLM broadcasts in these killings may have varied
somewhat, depending on the circumstances of these killings, the
Chamber finds that a causal connection has been established by
the evidence.64 . . .
Without a firearm, machete, or any physical weapon, he
[Nahimana] caused the deaths of thousands of innocent
civilians.65
Nahimana put a number of disparate and incongruent models of cau-
sation in play. In descending order of robustness, it found a direct “specific
causal connection,”66 but also conceded that “the extent of causation by
RTLM broadcasts in these killings may have varied somewhat,”67 and
later acknowledged that RTLM broadcasts may not have been the imme-
diate proximate cause of killings and that there may have been a number
of intervening factors in addition to the communication.68 In identifying
the mechanisms through which propaganda exerted its causal force,
Nahimana mixed its metaphors, combining the image of spreading gaso-
line with Nuremberg’s portrayal of a propagandist injecting poison into
the mind of a civilian population:
RTLM “spread petrol throughout the country little by little, so
that one day it would be able to set fire to the whole country.”
This is the poison described in the Streicher judgment.69
62. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1001.
63. Orentlicher, supra note 58, at 33 (citing Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judg-
ment, ¶¶ 970–77 to justify her interpretation).
64. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 482.
65. Id. ¶ 1099.
66. Id. ¶ 949.
67. Id. ¶ 482.
68. Id. ¶ 952.
69. Id. ¶ 1078. Nahimana summarized Streicher in some detail before proceeding to
gauge the consequences of the publications and broadcasts of the three accused. Id. ¶ 981.
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He [Ngeze] poisoned the minds of his readers, and by words and
deeds caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians.70
In its factual findings section on RTLM broadcasts, Nahimana identi-
fied three types of evidence connecting the radio station’s transmissions to
the genocide. First, some of the Tutsi individuals specifically mentioned by
name in broadcasts before and after 6 April 1994 were subsequently
killed.71 That RTLM broadcasts motivated listeners to take action was
proven by the testimony of one witness who reported being accosted in the
street by an attacker who referred to the content of a broadcast.72 Finally,
the nexus between broadcasts and killings was found in the threat per-
ceived by individuals who had been named in RTLM broadcasts.73
Assertions of causation, thus far confined to the factual findings sec-
tion of Akayesu and subsequent judgments, also featured in Nahimana’s
analysis of applicable case law. In a special section on “causation” in the
legal discussion of genocide, the Trial Chamber attributed a causation role
generally to “the media.”74 The same section noted that while the downing
of the Rwandan president’s plane may have triggered the genocide,
“RTLM, Kangura, and CDR were the bullets in the gun.”75 When it
turned to consider the separate charge of ICG, the Trial Chamber pro-
vided an inconsistent review of the applicable law. Nahimana makes refer-
ence to Akayesu’s factual finding of a causal relationship between the
defendant’s speech and widespread massacres—but mistakenly elevates
causation to an element of the legal findings section of the Akayesu deci-
sion.76 A few sentences later it backpedals, reaffirming that causation is
“not requisite to a finding of incitement.”77
The Trial Chamber’s disjointed perspective on causation in ICG en-
croached on its reasoning on other legal matters, such as Nahimana’s for-
mulation of incitement as a continuing crime—which, similarly to the
crime of conspiracy, continues in time until the target crime is fulfilled or
completed. “[T]he crime of incitement . . . continues to the time of the
commission of the acts incited,”78 the Trial Chamber wrote. “[T]he Cham-
ber notes . . . that the crime of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, like conspiracy, is an inchoate offense that continues in time un-
til the completion of the acts contemplated.”79 As a result, the Chamber
adopted the view that it could exercise its jurisdiction over “inchoate of-
70. Id. ¶ 1101. See id. ¶ 243 (“The ethnic hatred that permeates Kangura had the effect
of poison, as evidenced by the testimony of the witnesses.”).
71. Id. ¶ 478.
72. Id. ¶ 479.
73. Id. ¶ 480.
74. Id. ¶ 952.
75. Id. ¶ 953.
76. Id. ¶ 1015.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶ 104.
79. Id. ¶ 1017.
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fenses that culminate[d] in the commission of acts in 1994.”80 This view is
problematic because it carries certain assumptions: first, that genocidal
acts in 1994 actually resulted from prior inciting speech, and second, that
such commission is relevant to the adjudication of ICG, even though the
formal legal position is that the target crime need not be completed for
ICG to constitute a crime. Orentlicher correctly observes that “[t]his char-
acterization is hard to reconcile with the trial chamber’s view that, as an
inchoate offense, incitement is a crime regardless of whether it has its in-
tended effect (in the case of incitement to commit genocide, provoking
listeners to commit genocide). If the criminality of incitement does not
turn upon its impact, it is not readily apparent that this offense should be
considered to have ‘ended’ when it achieves its aim.”81
C. Continued Confusion at the Nahimana Appeals Chamber
In 2007, the Appeals Chamber in Nahimana corrected some of the
more egregious mistakes of fact and law in the Trial Chamber judgment
and reversed a number of its findings. As for the genocide charge (that is,
the charge of its direct commission), the Appeals Chamber acquitted all
three defendants of genocide convictions resulting from their leadership
positions at RTLM and Kangura. The Appeals Chamber found that there
was “no evidence that Appellant Nahimana played an active part in the
broadcasts after 6 April 1994 which instigated the commission of genocide.
Furthermore, the appeal record contains no evidence that Appellant
Nahimana had, before 6 April 1994, given instructions to RTLM journal-
ists to instigate the killing of Tutsi.”82 In acquitting Nahimana on the sepa-
rate charge of instigating genocide, the Appeals Chamber rejected the
Trial Chamber’s evidence of a link between RTLM broadcasts and acts of
genocide, declaring such evidence, “at the very least, tenuous.”83
Furthermore, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Nahimana seemed to in-
troduce a new criterion of temporality, in which genocidal speech acts had
to be uttered very near or simultaneous with the onset of an actual geno-
cide. The Appeals Chamber upheld the incitement convictions against
Nahimana for speeches and broadcasts after April 6, 1994 and against
Ngeze for publications of Kangura in early 1994 before the start of the
genocide.84 It overturned the ICG conviction of defendant Barayagwisa,
however, on the grounds that he was no longer in a position of superior
responsibility at the station after April 6, 1994, when the genocide began.
The Appeals Chamber found that “although it is clear that RTLM broad-
80. Id. ¶ 104.
81. Orentlicher, supra note 58, at 45.
82. Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶
597 (Nov. 28, 2007).
83. Id. ¶ 513. This comment refers specifically to prosecution evidence for the time
period before April 6, 1994, although Nahimana was also acquitted of incitement for the
period after April 6th. Id. at 346.
84. Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, at
346–347 (Nov. 28, 2007).
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casts between 1 January and 6 April 1994 incited ethnic hatred, it has not
been established that they directly and publicly incited the commission of
genocide.”85
Successive ICTR verdicts reaffirmed the Nahimana Appeals Cham-
ber’s temporal criterion. In 2008, for example, Rwandan pop musician Si-
mon Bikindi was convicted on the basis of his calls to violence made over a
public address system while genocide was occurring.86 According to
Gordon, the Tribunal implicitly confirmed the temporality criterion for-
mulated in Nahimana by absolving Bikindi of liability for anti-Tutsi songs
written before the genocide and maintained that only words uttered at or
near the time of genocidal violence may constitute incitement.87
On the question of the Trial Chamber’s construal of incitement as a
“continuing crime,” the ICTR Appeals Chamber pronounced that the
Trial Chamber had made an error in law in considering that incitement
continues in time until the completion of the crime’s intended purpose,
and therefore ICG cannot be considered a “continuing crime” like con-
spiracy.88 Instead, the Appeals Chamber correctly reaffirmed that the
crime of ICG “is completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered
or published, even though the effects of incitement may extend in time.”89
While the Nahimana Appeals Chamber cleared up a number of incon-
sistencies in the Trial Chamber judgment, it did not overtly address the
Trial Chamber’s reasoning on the relevance of causation in determining
whether ICG had been committed. In some instances, however—for in-
stance, insofar as it introduced a new temporality criterion—it implicitly
confirmed the centrality of causation and a proven chronological nexus
with the target crime.
Why does this matter? What is at stake, jurisprudentially, in the ICTR
case law on direct and public incitement to commit genocide? Put simply,
because they represent the first case law since Nuremberg, the ICTR’s
legal precedents on ICG are likely to influence international criminal law
for some time to come. It is fair to say that this has been one of the most
controversial areas of international criminal law in the last twenty years,
and several leading legal commentators have found the ICTR’s reasoning
on ICG sorely wanting. Nahimana is perhaps the most contentious of all
the ICTR’s judgments, and both its Trial Chamber and Appellate Cham-
ber opinions have sparked controversy. Diane Orentlicher, for example,
calls the Trial Chamber decision “problematic,” characterized by “unper-
suasive reasoning,” and representing such a rupture with existing law of
hate speech and incitement that it potentially violated the legal principle
85. Id. at ¶¶ 636, 754.
86. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 422, 426 (Dec. 2,
2008).
87. Gordon, Music and Genocide, supra note 10, at 263. For the relevant section, see
Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 255, 421.
88. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 723.
89. Id.
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of non-retroactivity.90 Alexander Zahar, an attorney at the ICTR and
ICTY, pronounces the same ruling “a very poor precedent,” and states
that the judges drifted into “legal activism, at worst legal absurdity.”91 Per-
haps most damning is the view expressed by Judge Theodor Meron in his
partly dissenting opinion in the Nahimana Appeals Chamber judgment.
Meron felt that there were so many errors of fact and law in the Nahimana
Trial Chamber judgment that “remanding the case, rather than undertak-
ing piecemeal remedies, would have been the best course.”92
Perhaps Meron’s call for a complete retrial was justified. Even though
the Nahimana Appeals Chamber corrected many mistakes in the trial rul-
ing, it glossed over others and left room for future misinterpretation—
especially given that it did not explicitly overturn the International Law
Commission’s view that the UN Genocide Convention’s article III(c) on
direct and public incitement to commit genocide only applies to acts of
incitement that “in fact occurs.” The exact role of causation in determining
ICG was one of those issues that was not fully presented and worked
through, and it continues to cast a shadow over the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal, even after the Nahimana Appeals Chamber judgment. The in-
consistency both within the ICTR’s incitement jurisprudence and between
the Appellate Chamber ruling and other sources of international law
thwarts the imperative to formulate unambiguous provisions in this new
field of international criminal law. It may also violate the rights of the
accused to be judged according to a coherent corpus of legal precedent.
That future tribunals will encounter such contradictory characterizations
of ICG destabilizes the legitimacy of international criminal law.
It is worth considering what might induce professional judges to aban-
don centuries of convention on the law of inchoate crimes to claim a
causal connection between speech acts and the crime of genocide—and
even to include causation in legal discussions of incitement without a doc-
trinal reason to do so. In the beginning, as this Article has already noted,
the causation claims proposed in Akayesu were a way of establishing the
directness aspect of the defendant’s inciting speech. But why has the cau-
sation element plagued a succession of judgments and even been elevated
from the factual findings to the legal discussion of judgments? In looking
for clues to explain a sudden rupture in legal reasoning, it can be fruitful to
look for the places in the text of judicial decisions where the logic breaks
down. In venturing a new legal precedent on the role of causation in in-
choate crimes, the Trial Chamber in Nahimana tied itself in analytical
knots:
With regard to causation, the Chamber recalls that incitement is a
crime regardless of whether it has the effect it intends to have. In
determining whether communications represent an intent to cause
90. Orentlicher, supra note 58, at 558–59, 576.
91. Zahar, supra note 58, at 33–34, 48.
92. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, at 375 (Meron, J.,
dissenting).
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genocide and thereby constitute incitement, the Chamber consid-
ers it significant that in fact genocide occurred. That the media
intended to have this effect is evidenced in part by the fact that it did
have this effect.93
The second sentence of this paragraph appears to be a non sequitur,
or at the very least contradicts the sentence before it. Either way, placing
the two statements sequentially defies logical coherence. Sentence three
engages in a perplexing reverse logic, where proof of intention is discov-
ered (“in part”) in the consequences of a speech act. The Nahimana Ap-
peals Chamber did not find this reasoning erroneous, on the grounds that
in some circumstances, the fact “that a speech leads to acts of genocide
could be an indication that in that particular context the speech was under-
stood to be an incitement to commit genocide, and that this was indeed the
intent of the author of the speech.”94
Can intentions in fact be read from subsequent acts? At times, yes: for
instance, when individual A encourages individual B to commit a crime
and B commits the crime in the way that A intended. And yet this is not
an infallible method; a speech act could lead to one outcome when the
speaker in fact intended another. What matters here, however, is not
whether effects (always, or even sometimes) prove intentions beyond rea-
sonable doubt, but that the ICTR judges contended that this was so, and
felt the need to repeatedly accentuate this point as they justified the cen-
trality of causation in determining ICG.
D. Causation: Compensating for Absence of Specific Intent?
The causation element may have been a method for the ICTR to com-
pensate for tenuous evidence for specific intent—allowing judges to re-
verse-engineer intention based on genocidal acts that occurred after a
speech or broadcast. The key to understanding how causation functioned
in judicial reasoning at the ICTR can be found in the problem of proving
specific intent to commit genocide, a particularly arduous exercise that has
vexed jurists for decades at international tribunals. This is relevant for
ICG cases because the type of intention in direct and public incitement to
commit genocide is not just any common-garden variety criminal inten-
tion. ICG requires specific intent (dolus specialis) to eliminate a protected
group as such, in whole or in part.95 Under international criminal law, spe-
cific intent calls for proof of a higher-order purpose, above and beyond the
standard intention merely to commit a prohibited act.96 There are times
93. Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶
1029 (Dec. 3, 2003) (emphasis added).
94. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 709.
95. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 44; see also Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case
No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 140 (April 19, 2004)(establishing any geno-
cide charge requires proof of specific intent).
96. For specific intent in genocide jurisprudence, see SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 260–
64.
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when the ICTR judges’ deliberations on specific intent border on ulterior
intent and even motive, where the intent transcends a wrongful act to tar-
get a larger objective for the sake of which the act is done. For instance,
the Akayesu Trial Chamber introduced “ulterior motive”97 into its defini-
tion of specific intent. Subsequent ICTR judgments continued with this
conflating of motive and intent, and their discussions of intention referred
to an “ulterior purpose” and “ulterior motive” to destroy a group.98
The heightened burden of proof for specific intent constitutes the
main reason why many defendants have been acquitted of genocide, espe-
cially at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.99
Proving specific intent therefore emerges as the judicial motivation to ex-
plain why causation featured in the way it did in ICTR judgments on in-
citement to commit genocide. The central issue that the judges faced in a
number of the early ICG cases like Akayesu and Nahimana was the yawn-
ing gap between the high threshold of specific intent to commit genocide
and the paucity of prosecution evidence for mens rea. Despite the conven-
tional wisdom in journalistic and human rights circles that the pro-govern-
ment radio and press was full of daily calls for genocide in 1994, strong
evidence for genocidal mens rea was not presented by the prosecution in
Nahimana. Former ICTR attorney Zahar finds himself “puzzled by the
court’s inability to come up with a single example—broadcast on RTLM
or printed in Kangura—of a blatant call on Hutu to hunt down and de-
stroy the Tutsi ethnic group.”100 He notes that while the thirty-seven frag-
ments of RTLM cited in the judgment are “brutal,” full of ethnic animus
and likely deserving of a penal response, “the fragments do not read like
97. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(“The perpetration of the act charged therefore extends beyond its actual commission, for
example, the murder of a particular individual, for the realisation of an ulterior motive, which
is to destroy, in whole or part, the group of which the individual is just one element.”).
98. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 165 (Jan. 27, 2000);
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-97-32-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 59–60 (Dec. 6, 1999).
99. Defendants acquitted of genocide (direct commission) at the ICTY include
Br–danin, Gvero, Jelisić, Krajišnik, Krstić, and Stakić. See Prosecutor v. Br–danin, Case No. IT-
99-36-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 1834 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jun 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment on
Appeal, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 5, 2001); Prosecutor v. Krajiš-
nik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 280 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 268
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No.
IT-97-24-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22,
2006). For a discussion of the demands of proving specific intent in ICTY cases, see RICHARD
ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 91 (Cambridge
University Press Law, 2011. There is no explicit judicial deliberation in the ICTY case law on
the question of causation. James G. Stewart has also observed this fact: “There is something
quite peculiar about international criminal justice as a discipline: causation has escaped direct
treatment by almost all courts and scholars.” James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189, 1194 (2012).
100. Zahar, supra note 58, at 37–38.
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direct and public incitement to commit genocide.”101 Zahar finds it re-
markable that “the prosecutor was not able to arrange for a single witness
to testify that he or she was incited by appeals or hints . . . to commit
genocide.”102 The allure of causation was that it compensated for the fra-
gility of the prosecution evidence for specific intent, and allowed judges to
reverse-engineer intention from the acts occurring after a speech or
broadcast.
This line of explanation finds additional support when we consider the
negative examples that exist in ICG case law—that is, those trials in which
causation made no appearance at all in the final judgment. Two cases war-
rant mention here: that of Rwandan pop star Simon Bikindi and the most
recent ICG case to date, that of Augustin Ngirabatware, decided on De-
cember 2012.103 In each of these cases, the inciting words of the accused
were much more explicitly, purposefully, and directly genocidal.
Even though the Trial Chamber attested that Bikindi’s “songs inspired
action,”104 and that “broadcasts of Bikindi’s songs had an amplifying ef-
fect on the genocide,”105 the defendant was convicted solely for his une-
quivocal calls to eliminate Tutsis, delivered in person over a public
loudspeaker system. The plain and unvarnished bluntness of Bikindi’s
speech formed the basis of the Trial Chamber’s determination of specific
intent, rather than any putative causal effects of his words. In fact, the
Bikindi judgment openly acknowledges that one witness did not testify to
any causal link between Bikindi’s speech to a crowd and a subsequent
killing, as the prosecutors’ indictment had claimed.106
Next, the Trial Chamber in Ngirabatware made no references to causa-
tion whatsoever in the judgment, in strong contrast to Akayesu,
Nahimana, and Ruggiu. Instead, it arrived at its conclusions regarding the
genocidal state of mind of the accused solely on the basis of the content of
Ngirabatware’s speech at a roadblock in 1994:
His instruction to ‘kill Tutsis’ objectively and unambiguously
called for an act of violence prohibited by Article 2(2) of the
Statue, and the Chamber has no doubt that Ngirabatware made
this statement with the intent to directly incite genocide.107
As a working hypothesis, then, we might posit that in ICG judgments
where the prosecution’s evidence of specific intent is incomplete and pre-
carious, then causation language in the final judgment performs the func-
tion of filling the evidentiary gaps in proving specific intent to commit
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 41.
103. See Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Judgment (Dec. 20,
2012); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment (Dec. 2, 2008).
104. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, ¶ 253.
105. Id. at ¶ 264.
106. Id. at ¶ 126.
107. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Judgment, ¶ 1368.
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genocide. But where a defendant’s words are direct and explicitly genoci-
dal—Ngirabatware’s “kill Tutsis,” for instance—then causation fades away
entirely in the judgment.
E. Long-Term Consequences of the ICTR’s Causality Jurisprudence
Having diagnosed the reasons why causation has been such a feature
of ICG jurisprudence at the ICTR, it is worth weighing the possible long-
term consequences of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. One potential negative
consequence relates to the challenging issue of genocide prevention. Pre-
vention is an underlying principle of enforcement against inchoate crimes
like ICG, yet thus far, no defendant has been indicted for ICG in the ab-
sence of an actual genocide.108 This is perplexing, especially if one consid-
ers that the overriding motivation of the drafters of the UN Genocide
Convention for including ICG as a crime was genocide prevention; that is,
in proscribing incitement to commit genocide, the objective was to inter-
dict the first steps in a deadly chain of events.109 An early draft of the
Genocide Convention, prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide
in April and May 1948, criminalized “direct incitement in public or in pri-
vate to commit genocide, whether such incitement be successful or
not,”110 and the Akayesu Trial Chamber noted that the “specific crime” of
ICG was established in the Convention “in particular, because of its criti-
cal role in the planning of a genocide.”111
In this light, the ICTR’s elevation of causality in the determination of
ICG thwarts the prevention clauses of the UN Genocide Convention.112
By finding directness and specific intention in outcomes, by insisting on
“proof of a possible causal link,” and by introducing a temporality crite-
rion that posits that incitement to commit genocide can only occur at or
near an actual genocide, the existing case law could hinder a range of pre-
ventative international responses to early genocidal speech. Such re-
sponses might range from jamming radio transmissions to issuing an
indictment against those most responsible as they launch a campaign of
genocidal propaganda. According to Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBeins,
the concern with causation at the ICTR “forces the potential victims of
hate propaganda to bear or absorb all risks” of inciting speech.113  If there
is an unspoken condition that courts will find ICG only in the context of
actual genocide, and prosecutors therefore feel they must prove a causal
nexus between inciting speech and genocidal acts, then such prosecutors
108. There have been no indictments for incitement to commit genocide at the ICTY,
Special Court for Sierra Leone or in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
109. See SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 521.
110. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide to the Econ. & Soc. Council, Apr. 5–May
10, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/794, Annex, art.iv(c), at 55 (1948).
111. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 551 (Sept. 2, 1998).
112. Genocide Convention arts. 1, 8.
113. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, From Sisyphus’s Dilemma to Sisyphus’s
Duty? A Meditation on the Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and
Genocide, 46 MCGILL L.J. 121, 125 (2000).
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are likely to wait until genocide is underway before charging an individual
for ICG. This formulation thwarts any preventive force that criminalizing
ICG could have, and encourages the international community to adopt a
“wait and see” approach. The central rationale of the crime of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide is to deter the kind of public exhor-
tations to commit genocide that ordinarily precede the onset of violence.
International criminal tribunals have been criticized for being reactive and
failing in their prevention and deterrence functions,114 and the ICTR’s in-
citement jurisprudence only compounds this shortcoming.
III. THE “GHOST OF CAUSATION” IN INTERNATIONAL
SPEECH CRIMES CASES
Causation slips into judicial rulings on incitement to genocide for
several reasons, all of which are signs of systemic difficulties in in-
ternational criminal law. First, there is a void to fill. Causation
stands in for a tool that courts are lacking: a systematic method for
identifying incitement to genocide. That crime, like other speech
crimes in international law, has not clearly been defined.
Susan Benesch115
Legal scholars and speech crimes experts have tried to resolve the in-
consistencies in the formulation of ICG at the ICTR in various ways. In
the noteworthy edited collection Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and In-
ternational Law, leading international speech crimes expert Susan Benesch
lucidly identifies the ways in which the “ghost of causation” has haunted
the international law of ICG.116 Benesch observes that in ICG cases,
ICTR judges have made stirring pronouncements on causation, even when
such pronouncements are neither required by law nor justified by the cir-
cumstantial evidence presented before the Tribunal. On the causal connec-
tion between speech acts and subsequent violence, she recognizes that “[i]t
is difficult to prove such a nexus, since the effect of speech on large groups
of people is hard to measure, poorly understood, and is only one of a con-
stellation of forces that affect why people act as they do.”117
Benesch’s framework makes a significant contribution to ICG legal
scholarship by focusing our attention on the conditions under which an
inciting speech act might be successful. However, examining her proposed
model in the context of Rwanda reveals the need for additional intellec-
tual groundwork: first, to establish the formal legal basis for inchoate
speech crimes such as ICG, and second, to separate inchoate crimes from
114. See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY xiv–xv (2009). But see
Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atroci-
ties?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (defending the prevention capabilities of international tribu-
nals). See SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 529 (reviewing criticisms of the Clinton Administration
and the international community for failing to act in the Rwandan genocide).
115. Benesch, Ghost of Causation, supra note 10, at 257.
116. Id. at 254.
117. Id. at 257.
300 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:277
other modes of liability for speech acts in connection with international
crimes.
A. Benesch’s “Likelihood of Genocide”
In the place of unfounded claims about the consequences of speeches
and broadcasts, Benesch, pace Brandenburg, advances a framework for
assessing the likelihood that a speech act could have resulted in genocide,
based upon the context of the speech act and the foreseeability that the
speech act would have genocidal consequences.118 Her matrix for evaluat-
ing the gravity of a speech act is comprised of five indicators.119 This sec-
tion summarizes her proposed criteria below, and I encourage readers to
consult Benesch’s publications for a fuller and more detailed rendition:
1. The degree of authority and influence of the speaker;
2. The disposition of the intended audience and its capacity to
commit violent acts;
3. The content of the speech acts and the degree to which they
were repetitive, dehumanized the victims, and were understood
as a call to violence;
4. The socio-historical context and history of inter-group rela-
tions; and
5. The form of transmission of the speech and degree of persua-
siveness of the form.120
These criteria, Benesch is careful to say, would not replace existing
law of ICG. Rather, they are formulated principally to assist prosecutors
at international tribunals, and to guide international agencies and govern-
ments as they decide whether to intervene or prevent genocide.121 Instead
of determining direct causation, Benesch’s criteria assess the likelihood
that a speech act could have foreseeable genocidal consequences. By of-
fering more nuanced and specific guidance on the contextual conditions
and likelihood that a speech act could incite violence, Benesch’s frame-
work complements and enhances existing ICTR case law.
At first glance, Benesch seems to have identified the most appropriate
“conditions of satisfaction”122 for potentially harmful utterances. Never-
theless, Benesch’s framework prompts a number of questions. It would be
useful to know, for example, whether—and if so, then how exactly—the
five criteria are grounded in social science research on the causal effects of
118. Id. at 262.
119. Id. at 262–64.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 262. See also Alexander C. Dale, Note, Countering Hate Messages that
Lead to Violence: The United Nations’ Chapter VII Authority to Use Radio Jamming to Halt
Incendiary Broadcasts, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (2001) (regarding jamming radio
broadcasts during genocide by the international community).
122. To borrow a phrase from John Searle which refers to “the conditions in the world
which must be satisfied if the intentional state is to be satisfied.” JOHN SEARLE, MAKING THE
SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION 29 (2010).
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propaganda and hate speech, so that the reader might assess the criteria
on the basis of rigorous empirical studies. It would also be beneficial to
have supporting social science evidence on the degree of relevance and
relative weight of each of the factors; for instance, is the authority of the
speaker more or less important than the history of inter-group relations?
Research might also inform us about variation within the individual cate-
gories: for instance, do some types of authority figures (for example, relig-
ious figures, government officials or military leaders) command more
influence in a labile population than others, and if so, then when and why?
Research on propaganda and inciting speech may point toward other fac-
tors not included by Benesch that also demand consideration, such as the
role of moral disgust as the psychological mechanism that underlies the
effectiveness of dehumanizing language.123
B. Revisiting Cause and Effect in Rwanda
The Article raises the above questions about Benesch’s model for
evaluating speech acts because recent empirical social science studies cast
doubt upon the international tribunal’s account of the role of propaganda
and the media in 1994 Rwanda.124 On the basis of one hundred interviews
of convicted perpetrators in a Kigali prison, Rwandan cultural anthropolo-
gist Charles Mironko found that many ordinary villagers either did not
receive genocidal radio transmissions or did not interpret them in the way
they were intended.125 Mironko therefore urges caution in ascribing a
causal link between RTLM broadcasts and genocidal killings: “[T]his in-
formation alone did not cause them to kill.”126 Scott Straus’s more quanti-
tative study of the relationship between radio and violence in Rwanda
both corroborates and extends Mironko’s study.127 Straus identifies a
number of flaws in the ICTR’s reasoning and fact-finding: RLTM’s cover-
age was very uneven, especially in rural areas, and only ten percent of the
population owned a radio in 1994; the initial violence did not correspond
with areas of broadcast coverage and the most extreme and inflammatory
broadcasts came after most of the killings had been carried out.128 Straus
complements his quantitative analysis with 200 perpetrator interviews, and
these revealed that radio listeners did not necessarily internalize the ele-
123. See, e.g., Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanized Perception: A Psycho-
logical Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture and Genocide?, 175 J. PSYCHOL. 219 (2011)
(discussing two recent cognitive neuroscience experiments on dehumanizing language).
124. See, e.g., Richard Carver, Broadcasting & Political Transition: Rwanda and Be-
yond, in AFRICAN BROADCAST CULTURES: RADIO IN TRANSITION 188 (Richard Fardon &
Graham Furniss eds., 2000).
125. Charles Mironko, The Effect of RTLM’s Rhetoric of Ethnic Hatred in Rural
Rwanda, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 125, 129–30 (Allan Thompson ed.,
2007).
126. Id. at 134.
127. SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN RWANDA
(2d ed. 2006); Straus, supra note 4.
128. Straus, supra note 3, at 616–20, 622.
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ments of anti-Tutsi propaganda. Perhaps most crucially, no respondent
cited the radio broadcasts as the most important reason for their participa-
tion in the genocide.129
Both Mironko and Straus’s respondents reported that that peer pres-
sure from male neighbors and kin exerted more influence on their partici-
pation in killing than did government and radio propaganda.130 Like
Mironko, Straus infers that the radio broadcasts functioned as a device to
coordinate attacks and were meant primarily for local authorities, who
played the main role in mobilizing citizens directly: “Radio did not cause
the genocide or have direct, massive effects. Rather, radio emboldened
hard-liners and reinforced face-to-face mobilization. . . .”131 This social
science research offers quite a different model of violence than that as-
serted by the ICTR judges: instead of positing a relationship between lead-
ers’ speeches and popular genocidal acts, it points towards speeches as a
form of communication between elites, who then recruited on a personal
or kin basis.
Economist David Yanagizawa-Drott, the only social science re-
searcher cited by Benesch in her piece, is an outlier in his finding that
approximately 10 per cent of the participation in the genocide can be at-
tributed to the radio broadcasts, corresponding to an estimated 50,000
murders.132 At this point we can reliably say only that the empirical evi-
dence on the effect of propaganda is mixed, and until more conclusive
evidence is available, it would be prudent to approach with circumspection
ICTR judges’ forceful claims about a direct connection between speech
acts and violence.
C. Application of the Benesch Factors in General
In evaluating Benesch’s model, other questions arise related to the
adversarial process of the international criminal courtroom. If the prosecu-
tion is to build its theory of an incitement case on probable causation, then
it is not at all evident what type and threshold of probability the prosecu-
tion is aiming for. In my reading, ICTR case law has set the threshold of
proving causation for ICG quite a bit lower than the conventional “cause-
in-fact” or “but-for” causation threshold of certain areas of U.S. law.133
Under the “but-for” standard, the defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of
129. Id. At 626.
130. Id. at 628–29. See also Mironko, supra note 125.
131. Id. at 631.
132. David Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan
Genocide.,” 129 Q. J. ECON. 1947 (2014). . .
133. International criminal tribunals do not apply the but-for test of causation as a mat-
ter of course. This is generally stated in the Kordić and Čerkez Trial Chamber judgment at
§391. Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 391
(Feb. 26, 2001). Reviewing key speech crimes cases such as Nahimana AC we learn that for
indirect modes of liability such as instigation: “The actus reus of instigating implies prompting
another person to commit an offense. It is not necessary to prove that the crime would not
have been perpetrated without the involvement of the accused .” Id. At §480. This position
on the actus reus of instigation was refined further by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Blaškić
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the particular prohibited result if the result would not have occurred in the
absence of the defendant’s conduct.134 No international criminal tribunal
has yet to provide a definitive statement on how a standard of probable
causation could, in incitement to commit genocide cases, relate to the gen-
eral criminal law requirement to prove a crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Until it does, we are in uncharted waters.
Additionally, Benesch’s matrix is explicitly designed as a tool of analy-
sis to guide the prosecution in identifying the crime of ICG. But if it can
confirm incitement, then so, too, must it be able to refute incitement if it
aspires to be a testable and verifiable theory. However, Benesch does not
elaborate on the conditions under which a particular speech act would not
meet the requirements for ICG, and this suggests a worrying confirmation
bias in the model.
Under what conditions would a speech act not constitute ICG? The
proposed framework appears overly directed towards making a finding of
ICG: it leads the user into a spectrum of criminal liability where the an-
swer to the question “Does this particular speech act constitute direct and
public incitement to commit genocide?” will likely vary from “a little bit”
to “a lot.” Benesch does not assist a court to identify the conditions in
which the response is “not at all.” In addition, it is a cause for concern that
Benesch does not acknowledge how the context can cut both ways, and
how listeners may hear an inciting message, but reject it and turn away.
If Benesch’s model is consciously designed to guide the prosecution at
an international tribunal, then we can expect it to be challenged by de-
fense counsel as neither neutral nor objective. Experienced criminal de-
fense attorneys may reasonably ask a series of thorny questions such as,
“Why should a court or international body use these five criteria and not
another five? Are not these criteria avowedly created to assist the prose-
cution side of the case, and would their origin not lead defense counsel
and possibly the court to question their neutrality and objectivity? How
are these criteria grounded in legal precedent, and, invoking the Frye test,
to what degree are they accepted within a community of scholars and ex-
perts on propaganda and incitement?135
The concern here is that Benesch proposes a model that aims to be
predictive without actually being testable. It is a probabilistic framework,
case: “Although it must be proved that the instigation was a clear contributing factor to the
commission of the crime, it need not be a conditio sine qua non.” Id. At §270.
134. See, e.g., Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990). J.W.
Cecil Turner traces the origins of the but-for test to an 1874 English homicide case, R v.
Towers, 12 Cox 530 (T.A.C. 1847). J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY’S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 18 (1958).
Andre Moenssens observes that in rare instances if the “but for” test of causation-in-
fact fails, then US criminal courts may use a “substantial factor” test in which, for instance,
two separate defendants acting independently, commit two separate acts, each of which alone
will not bring about the prohibited result, but when considered together, will. See MOEN-
SSENS, CRIMINAL LAW 119 (7th ed. 2003); JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 2006).
135. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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yet one which does not clearly identify the threshold of probability to be
employed, nor its criteria of falsifiability. In this way, it suffers from the
same ambiguity that afflicts ICTR rulings: while the Akayesu Trial Cham-
ber requires proof of a “possible causal link,” Benesch proposes a similar
method that relies upon “the likelihood that the speech could have caused
genocide.”136 Insofar as Benesch does not explain how her model is testa-
ble and falsifiable on an evidentiary basis, it occupies the same uncomfort-
able halfway house of potential causation as do the ICTR decisions
themselves. On the principle of legality, should we not be wary of convict-
ing individuals of international speech crimes based upon a test of
probability that is ill defined?
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFUSION: ICG AND AUSTIN’S
THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS
Scholars typically define or categorize inchoate crimes only in the
negative, as crimes that are not consummate, and even this distinc-
tion is unexplained. What is needed instead is an affirmative ac-
count of the inchoate category . . . a conceptual framework to
support the claim or intuition that recognizing this category is
useful . . . .
Michael T. Cahill137
There is something which is at the moment of uttering being done
by the person uttering.
J.L. Austin138
Cahill’s quote is symptomatic of the critical legal commentary on in-
choate crimes, which are often considered theoretically wobbly compared
with completed or “consummated” crimes. In the criminal courtroom,
their negative conceptualization and amorphous nature may also render
them vulnerable to judicial revisionism. As we have seen at the ICTR,
when international criminal tribunal judges are presented with evidence
regarding the causal effects of inciting speech, they seemingly cannot resist
invoking them in their factual findings, and they even come to weave cau-
sation into the fabric of their legal reasoning. In taking up Cahill’s chal-
lenge, the aim of this Part is to provide a proper philosophical grounding
for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
In resolving the confusion surrounding causation in the international
law of ICG, I turn to the theories of British philosopher of language J.L.
Austin. As one of the more influential philosophers of the twentieth cen-
tury, the literature on Austin’s theory of speech acts is too vast to review
136. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 349 (Sept. 2, 1998) ;
see Benesch, Ghost of Causation, supra note 10, at 256;
137. Michael Cahill, Defining Inchoate Crimes: An Incomplete Attempt, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 751, 754 (2012) (footnote omitted).
138. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 60.
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here, yet fortunately some excellent retrospectives of his work are availa-
ble.139 In my engagement with speech act theory, I primarily rely upon
Austin’s own writings, augmented by those of his leading modern propo-
nent, U.S. philosopher John Searle.
The thesis advanced here is that Austin provides us with a theory of
speech acts that, if applied in international criminal law, would advance a
coherent development of ICG jurisprudence. Crucially, Austin’s conceptu-
alization of utterances disaggregates three aspects of each utterance and
chronologically orders them. By breaking each speech act into three
dimensions, we can differentiate the aspects of the meaning and the per-
suasive force from the subsequent effects of a speech act. And by differen-
tiating the meaning and persuasive force dimensions from the
consequences, we can see how an inchoate speech crime like incitement to
commit genocide might pertain to what a speaker meant and what he was
encouraging others to do, rather than the consequences of his or her
words. Such a process would focus courts on the content and conduct of
his or her speech act, rather than its subsequent effects in the world—and
thereby facilitate the prevention of incitement rather than its ex post facto
punishment. Subsequent effects of the inciting speech act, including any
potential uptake and criminal acts committed by listeners, would then be
relevant to modes of liability for completed crimes such as ordering, insti-
gating and aiding and abetting.
A. Austin’s Speech Act Theory and Legal Scholarship
I do not pretend that Austin’s theories are straightforward or uncon-
troversial; however, they are applicable to our discussion because they
have featured prominently in debates on the relationship between lan-
guage and the law over the last fifty years. As Nicola Lacey demonstrates,
Austin had a profound impact on one of the foremost philosophers of law
in the twentieth century, H.L.A. Hart, even though Hart seldom made
reference to Austin explicitly.140 More recently in the United States,
speech act theory has featured prominently in the writings of feminist legal
scholars seeking to establish ordinances recognizing pornography as a civil
139. See, e.g., THE PHILOSOPHY OF J.L. AUSTIN (Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli
eds., 2011); JAMES LOXLEY, PERFORMATIVITY (2006). For classic philosophical texts inspired
by Austin, see Stanley Cavell, Passionate and Performative Utterance: Morals of Encounter, in
CONTENDING WITH STANLEY CAVELL 177–98 (Russell B. Goodman ed., 2005); STANLEY
CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY
(1979); PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS (1986); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
140. NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM 133 (2004). For an application of ordinary language philosophy to the law generally,
and criminal law in particular, see DANIEL YEAGER, J.L. AUSTIN AND THE LAW: EXCULPA-
TION AND THE EXPLICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY (2006). Yeager explores the implications of
Austin’s theories for inchoate crimes such solicitation and conspiracy, but his objectives are
different from mine in this article. Id. at 137–39.
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rights violation.141 More generally, Austin has inspired many advocates of
heightened legal regulation of hate speech. For example, in his influential
book Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language, Kent Greenawalt observes
that some kinds of speech go beyond mere assertions of fact and, in threat-
ening, ordering, or exhorting, become “situation-altering utterances” that
change the social context in which we live.142 Given their practical and
decisive effects, such as changing a person’s status or enforcing contractual
obligations, Greenawalt argues that some such utterances lie outside the
scope of the principle of free speech and therefore are “subject to regula-
tion on the same bases as most non-communicative behavior.”143
While they might be similar in some ways—that is, they are forms of
speech that cause or may have the potential to cause harm per se—hate
speech, pornography, and ICG are quite distinct as categories of criminal
law. ICG is always and everywhere illegal and has achieved the global
status of jus cogens, whereas hate speech and pornography are illegal only
to varying degrees and are legal in many settings. To my knowledge, no
scholar of international criminal law has thus far engaged with speech act
theory in analyzing the crime of ICG, which is perhaps surprising given its
ubiquity in domestic hate-speech debates.144 None have applied Austin’s
theory of speech acts to distinguish between forms of criminal liability that
require proof of criminal consequences (such as instigating persecution
and deportation) and non-causal speech crimes (such as ICG and hate
speech as a form of persecution).
B. Austin’s Speech Act Theory
Now, to the argument itself. A direct call for the destruction of a
group protected by the 1948 UN Genocide Convention in a public setting,
even if utterly ignored by its intended audience, is a criminal act. This type
of “genocidal speech” is a crime per se, by virtue of what it itself does.145
Standard theories justify the category of inchoate crimes by conceiving of
the proscribed crime as an initial step towards a grievous target crime.146
In order to provide firmer foundations for these classic criminal law argu-
141. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Rae Langton, Speech
Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1993).
142. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–59 (1989).
143. Id. at 58. Defenders of unfettered free speech such as Franklyn Haiman charge
Greenawalt with conflating words and deeds, arguing instead that language is largely sym-
bolic and devoid of any subsequent effects. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 1–4 (1992). Another renowned critic of the movement to curtail pornog-
raphy, sexist language and “hate speech” is Stanley Fish. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S
NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994).
144. Predrag Dojčinović, a scholar and investigator at the ICTY, has used the theories
of John Searle in a creative fashion to examine instigation and hate speech as a form of
persecution. Predrag Dojčinović, Word Scene Investigations: Toward a Cognitive Linguistic
Approach to the Criminal Analysis of Open Source Evidence in War Crimes Cases, in PROPA-
GANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 71–117.
145. Genocide Convention art. 3(c).
146. See Cahill, supra note 137 at 754–55.
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ments, we need to delve deeper into the philosophy of language, and com-
prehend how speech acts are specifically acts, and how words do things.
We might profitably start with J.L. Austin’s How To Do Things With
Words, a groundbreaking treatise that transformed both philosophy and
linguistics.147
Austin was part of a mid-twentieth century movement in the philoso-
phy of language associated with the figure of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who
discovered meaning in concrete usage of language rather than through
theories of semantics. Austin’s famous credo was, “To say something is to
do something.”148 Austin challenged the “descriptive fallacy” of prevailing
philosophical orthodoxy, which held that sentences could be evaluated on
the basis of the accuracy of their referential account of the world.149 In-
stead, speech acts are acts—deeds in and of themselves—and therefore
can be assessed according to what each individual speech act does: that is,
according to its function.
In How to Do Things With Words, Austin draws our attention to a
category of language overlooked by the descriptive model of language. In
a class of sentences that Austin calls “performative utterances,” the utter-
ance is the act itself.150 Examples include, “I marry you,” “I warn you the
bull is dangerous,” “I apologize,” “I find you guilty,” “I congratulate you,”
“I welcome you,” and so on.
Austin identifies three aspects of performative utterances: the locutio-
nary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary aspects.151 The locutionary
aspect, or locution, contains the semantic and grammatical attributes that
together denote the meaning of a proposition. That is, they convey the
utterance as one “with a certain sense and a certain reference.”152 John
Searle glosses the locutionary attribute as the “content of the act . . . the
propositional content.”153 The illocutionary element of a speech act, or
illocution, denotes the use or function of the sentence: that is, its force and
the degree to which it urges, advises, or orders.154 Loxley defines the il-
147. AUSTIN, supra note 14.
148. Id. at 12.
149. Id. at 100. Here, Austin got a little carried away. Just because some sentences are
performative utterances that achieve a result in their very utterance (“I promise”), does not
mean that all sentences are of this kind. John Searle, Austin’s foremost successor in philoso-
phy, accepts that many speech acts aim to match an independent existing reality and can be
evaluated on this basis. SEARLE, supra note 122, at 11–12 (2010).
150. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 6.
151. Id. at 94–101.
152. Id. at 94.
153. In this quote, Searle (p. 137–138) breaks down the “illocutionary act” into two
dimensions; the propositional content which refers to the locutionary aspect and the type of
act it is and the force it has, which refers to the illocutionary aspect. JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND,
LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL WORLD 137 (1998). In this quote,
Searle (p. 137–138) breaks down the “illocutionary act” into two dimensions; the proposi-
tional content which refers to the locutionary aspect and the type of act it is and the force it
has, which refers to the illocutionary aspect.
154. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 98.
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locutionary force of an utterance as “the function it performs” in, for ex-
ample, “promising, threatening, ordering, or persuading.”155 Austin
dedicates most of his energy in How to Do Things with Words to dissecting
the illocutionary quality of speech acts such as informing, ordering, warn-
ing, and threatening: that is, those “utterances which have a certain (con-
ventional) force.”156
The third or perlocutionary property of a performative utterance, or
perlocution, invites analogy to the causation analysis that plagues ICG ju-
risprudence. Perlocution refers to the consequences a speech act has for
the feelings, thoughts, or actions of a listener.157 The concrete effects of a
perlocution may be, inter alia, to convince, persuade, deter, surprise, or
mislead. Austin is careful to say that speech acts do not always persuade in
the way they are intended, as this depends on the “uptake” by the lis-
tener.158 Austin is careful to point out that there may be “infelicities,” or
conditions under which performative utterances are unfulfilled or inva-
lid,159 and that speech acts may also have unintended consequences.160
Loxley says of the perlocutionary aspects of an utterance: “[T]hey are not
predictable or regular.”161
To summarize, then, Austin distinguishes between the three orders of
a speech act thus: “the locutionary act . . . which has a meaning; the illocu-
tionary act which has a certain force in saying something; the perlocution-
ary act which is the achieving of certain effects by saying something.”162 In
the argument that follows, I follow attentively Austin’s distinctions be-
tween the meaning, force, and effects of a speech act.
C. Application to ICG and Other Inchoate Crimes
How might we apply Austin’s theory of speech acts to the interna-
tional law of incitement? As it happens, Austin was quite cognizant of the
ramifications of his theory of speech acts for the law, observing that
performative speech acts comprise the operative or contractual element of
a legal instrument that serves to effect an authorized transaction.163 Fur-
thermore, Austin included as “performative utterances” a number of ex-
amples that authorize, sanction, warn, or threaten, and so it seems fair to
include incitement under the general category of illocutionary performa-
155. LOXLEY, supra note 139, at 168.
156. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 108.
157. Id. at 101. Loxley defines the perlocutionary aspect as follows: “[t]he perlocution-
ary aspect of an utterance is any effect it achieves on its hearers or readers that is a conse-
quence of what is said.” LOXLEY, supra note 139, at 169.
158. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 116–17.
159. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 14.
160. See id. at 101, 106.
161. LOXLEY, supra note 139, at 169.
162. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 122.
163. Id. at 6–7. An example could be as follows, “Upon my death, I hereby bestow my
entire estate to my Schnauzer, Pepper Pot.”
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tive utterances.164 The appropriateness of Austin’s model of language to
our discussion is apparent in the example he used to illustrate the distinc-
tion between locutions, illocutions and perlocutions. This is reproduced
below, as it appears in the original text:
Act (A) or Locution
He said to me “Shoot her!” meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and refer-
ring by “her” to her.
Act (B) or Illocution
He urged (or advised or ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.
Act (C.a) Perlocution
He persuaded me to shoot her.
Act (C.b) [or Perlocution]
He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.165
Distinguishing between the three orders of speech acts helps to justify
and explain incitement as an inchoate crime, and to provide grounds for
my questioning of the causal language that characterizes the ICTR’s in-
citement rulings. Since it is an inchoate crime, intent to commit genocide
focuses upon the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of a speech act, not
on the perlocutionary dimensions. Notwithstanding ICTR jurisprudence
that would suggest otherwise, direct and public incitement to commit ge-
nocide criminalizes steps A and B, regardless of, and ideally in advance of
and with the aim of preventing, steps C.a. and C.b. In the law of ICG, the
specific intent to commit acts C.a. and C.b. can be found in the logically
prior stages A and B.
Moreover, Austin’s emphasis on illocutions assists in our comprehen-
sion of incitement as a crime that is constituted on the basis of its meaning
and what exactly it is urging or encouraging others to do. Parallel argu-
ments have been made with regard to hate speech.166 Philosopher Rae
Langton advances one thesis directly based on Austin’s philosophy of
speech acts. Langton makes the case that pornography is in itself an act of
discrimination and therefore constitutes unprotected speech that may be
subjected to statutory limitations.167 Langton emphasizes what she calls
“authoritative illocutions;” that is, speech acts whose force can officially
justify, promote, condone, and legitimate acts of subordination and dis-
crimination.168 One such speech act she considers is, “Blacks are not per-
mitted to vote,” as uttered by a legislator in apartheid South Africa.169 In
164. Id. at 57–58.
165. Id. at 101–02.
166. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 4–6 (2012); Maravilla,
supra note 58; Joseph Rikhof, Hate Speech and International Criminal Law: The Mugesera
Decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1121, 1126 (2005).
167. Langton, supra note 141.
168. Id. at 305. See also Benesch, Ghost of Causation, supra note 10, at 262 (recently
advocating this approach).
169. Langton, supra note 141.
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this instance, Langton observes that “[t]he authoritative role of the
speaker imbues the utterance with a force that would be absent were it
made by someone who did not occupy that role.”170 Langton helps us to
understand how ICG is a crime because of what it itself does: namely to
legitimate, authorize, and condone genocidal behavior.
Speech act theory conventionally draws sharp lines among the mean-
ing, the force, and the effects of a speech act. To what degree are these
three orders in fact distinct and chronological? Austin’s illustration of an
inciting speech act above presents the three orders sequentially, listing
them as “A, B, C.a, C.b” and indicating a series progression. It stands to
reason that locutions precede perlocutions, since logically a proposition
cannot have a consequence until a listener has heard and comprehended
the proposition.
However, the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of a speech act
may occur almost simultaneously; the propositional content and the force
may be conveyed in the same moment. Similarly, some speech acts may
have aftereffects that arrive within moments of, or even simultaneously
with, the statement itself. For instance, a listener might be convinced or
repelled by an inciting utterance in the instant that it is delivered—al-
though again, since humans are not simple automatons, they may come to
question and even repudiate their initial response.
Refocusing on the problem of the role of causation in ICG helps to
resolve these matters somewhat. While morally reprehensible, simply be-
lieving that the speaker is justified in his or her public and direct call for
genocide is not in itself a crime under international criminal law, which
does not proscribe mere thoughts. All of the specifically criminal perlocu-
tionary acts that may or may not follow an inciting speech act (for exam-
ple, extermination or deportation of a protected group, in whole or in
part) must both logically and practically come after the utterance is com-
pleted. Therefore, while some perlocutionary acts could be considered
more or less simultaneous with illocutions, all criminal perlocutions—and
especially those, such as genocide, that require widespread and systematic
collective orchestration—logically occur after locutions and illocutions.
Austin’s writings provide firm foundations for this interpretation, and
at various points he insists on the distinction between the performative
utterance and its consequences, stating, “We have then to draw the line
between an action we do (here an illocution) and its consequences.”171
Austin asserts there is “a break at a certain regular point between the act
(our saying something) and its consequences (which are usually not the
saying of anything),”172 and he finds a “regular natural break in the chain”
between illocutions and their consequences.173 While Austin accepts that a
170. Id., at 304.
171. See AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 111 (providing an illustrative example). See also id.
at 23.
172. Id. at 112.
173. Id. at 113.
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connection may be identified between a speech act and its physical conse-
quences, this chain of causation “does not seem to prevent the drawing of
a line . . . between the completion of the illocutionary act and all conse-
quences thereafter.”174 Austin’s logical distinction between the meaning
and force of a speech act on the one hand, and their consequences on the
other, is endorsed in the post-Austin philosophical literature, with Searle
reaffirming that “[w]e need to distinguish illocutionary acts . . . from the
effects or consequences that illocutionary acts have on hearers.”175
But more remains to be said about how speech act theory relates to
criminal intention. The speaker’s intention is the ultimate issue in an ICG
trial, and it is standard orthodoxy in both speech act theory and the law of
inchoate crimes that the subjective intention of the speaker can be found
only in what Austin terms the locutionary and illocutionary attributes of
an utterance. Searle draws our attention to the “theory of intentionality”
built into the distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionary aspects of a speech act—in which the speaker’s intention is
concentrated in the meaning and force of a speech act, and not in its ef-
fects, which are unpredictable and dependent on the disposition and sub-
sequent behavior of the listener.176 Searle writes:
Typically, illocutionary acts have to be performed intentionally. If
you did not intend to make a promise or statement, then you did
not make a promise or statement. But perlocutionary acts do not
have to be performed intentionally . . . . The fact that illocutionary
acts are essentially intentional, whereas perlocutionary acts may
or may not be intentional, is a consequence of the fact that the
illocutionary act is the unit of meaning in communication . . . Il-
locutionary acts, meaning, and intention are all tied
together . . . .177
Only the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of the speech act are
entirely under the control of the speaker. Where ICG is charged, only the
utterances of the speaker are under legal scrutiny for the evidence they
might contain of intention to commit genocide. In most situations, the
hearer may decide whether the illocutionary force of a statement is con-
vincing or not, and even if it is persuasive, then the listener still can decide
not to act. Even in the most hierarchical situations—such as the structure
of command and control commonly found in military organizations, in
which a superior gives orders to a subordinate, perlocutionary acts are
only partially under the control of the speaker. History is full of examples
where subordinates ignored or disobeyed an order, only carried out part of
an order, misunderstood the order, deserted from their unit, or sought to
carry out an order but failed because of their incompetence or because
174. Id. at 114.
175. SEARLE, supra note 139, at 136.
176. See id. at 137–39.
177. Id. at 137.
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circumstances prevented them.178 As John Searle observes, with most
speech acts, “the perlocutionary effects on the hearer are in large part up
to the hearer.”179
If an international court does not distinguish between the three orders
of a speech act, then it may be prone to mistaken suppositions about
where the intention of speech acts lies. Dressler’s Understanding Criminal
Law observes that actual causation and mens rea (criminal intention) are
“independent concepts, each of which must be proven in criminal prosecu-
tion. Frequently, however, these doctrines are confused.”180 Austin him-
self is quite clear that we must distinguish between intended and
unintended consequences of speech acts:
Since our acts are actions, we must always remember the distinc-
tion between producing effects or consequences which are in-
tended or unintended; and (i) when the speaker intends to
produce an effect it may nevertheless not occur, and (ii) when he
does not intend to produce it, it may nevertheless occur.181
One famous example from the United Kingdom illustrates in domestic
criminal law how consequences, or perlocutioary acts, can be a false guide
to meaning and intention. For example, in a famous British case, teenager
Derek Bentley was hanged in 1953 for the murder of a police officer dur-
ing a burglary attempt, even though the officer was shot by Bentley’s
friend and accomplice, Christopher Craig, then aged 16.182 When con-
fronted by police officers during the burglary of a warehouse, Bentley was
alleged to have called out to Craig, “Let him have it, Chris.” Bentley, who
did not possess a gun, was at that moment overpowered and docile, and he
had warned police about the dangerous mental state of his accomplice.
Fifteen minutes later, after Bentley had already been arrested and hand-
cuffed, Craig shot Police Constable Sidney Miles dead while resisting ar-
rest. The prosecutor’s opening words claimed that Bentley “incited Craig
to begin the shooting and, although technically under arrest at the actual
time of the killing of Miles, was party to that murder and equally responsi-
ble in law.”183 The jury, as directed by Judge Goddard in his summing up,
interpreted Bentley’s “Let him have it” statement as deliberate incitement
to murder, rather than a call to surrender the weapon: a line of reasoning
178. See JAROSLAV HASEK, THE GOOD SOLDIER SCHWEIK (2010). The U.S. Army’s
Uniform Code of Military Justice certainly recognizes the possibility of soldiers’ non-compli-
ance and under “10. Punitive Articles,” includes the following violations of the code: Deser-
tion (885), Contempt Toward Officials (888), Disrespect Toward Superior Commissioned
Officer (889), and Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation (892). See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946
(1950), available at UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, http://www.ucmj.us.
179. SEARLE, supra note 122, at 190.
180. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 185 (Lexis Nexis eds., 5th
ed. 2009).
181. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 106.
182. R v. Derek William Bentley, [2001] 1 Crim. App. R. 307 (Eng.).
183. Id. § 1.
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based in part upon the actual outcome.184 Over time, however, the British
legal establishment found fault with Judge Goddard’s direction to the jury
regarding Bentley’s alleged incitement.185 The Bentley case became a
cause célèbre and a touchstone in the eventually successful campaign to
ban the death penalty in Great Britain. In 1998, Derek Bentley was
granted a posthumous pardon by the highest criminal appeals court in En-
gland and Wales.186
Austin’s framework also has implications for the “directness” aspect
of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Krauss
and Chiu write, “When the locutionary and illocutionary force of an utter-
ance (that is, its literal and intended meaning) are the same, the result is
termed a direct speech act; when an utterance’s locutionary and illocution-
ary force are different. . . , the result is termed an indirect speech act.”187
So for the incitement to be direct, the meaning and force of the utterance
must coincide. If the two are not aligned in this way, then the speech act is
indirect—which, depending on the facts, may constitute a moral transgres-
sion or even another international crime (such as hate speech that consti-
tutes persecution, a crime against humanity)—and falls short of ICG. In
my reading, the implication of Austin’s philosophy of speech acts for inter-
national criminal law is to narrow the range of impermissible statements to
those that are comparable to Julius Streicher’s “The Jews in Russia must
be killed. They must be exterminated root and branch,” or ICTR defen-
dant Augustin Ngirabatware’s “kill Tutsis.”188
This narrowing range of utterances that would qualify as incitement
does not a priori exclude euphemisms,189 if the prosecution can show that
the overwhelming majority of listeners understood a euphemistic form of
speech as a direct (rather than circuitous, oblique or veiled) call to commit
genocide.190 Readers familiar with the hate speech literature in the United
184. See id. §II(3).
185. And the standard of proof to be applied in the case.
186. See Duncan Campbell, The Bentley Case: Justice at Last, 45 Years Too Late for
‘Meek and Sheeplike’ Derek Bentley, GUARDIAN (London), July 31, 1998 (describing the pos-
thumous quash of Derek William Bentley’s conviction). Bentley Trial Unfair Through Flawed
Summing-Up, TIMES (London), July 31, 1998 (describing how conviction was overturned due
to the standard of proof applied due to the judge’s incorrect summing up).
187. ROBERT KRAUSS & CHI-YUE CHIU, Language and Social Behavior, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 44 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
188. Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences, at 295.
189. The Bikindi TC judgment discusses the use of euphemisms for Tutsis such as “ac-
complices” and cockroaches” during inciting radio broadcasts: “A reading of the RTLM tran-
scripts reveals assimilation between the Inkotanyi – designation used for the “enemy”, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – and, on some occasions, the Tutsi ethnic group. It also
reveals that the derogatory term “Inyenzi”, meaning cockroach, was used for the assailants
and, more generally, the Tutsi ethnic group. From April to June 1994, RTLM journalists
called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against Inkotanyi and Inyenzi, the RPF, and
its “accomplices”, the Tutsi ethnic group.” Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T,
Judgment, at ¶ 114.
190. Mere comprehension is not in itself a perlocutionary aspect of an utterance, it is
simply an indication that the locutionary and illocutionary aspects have been heard and un-
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States might find this outcome somewhat surprising, since advocates of
hate speech regulation such as Greenawalt and Langton cited earlier have
tended to use ordinary language philosophy to expand the range of speech
acts not protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.191 In
the case of the international law of ICG, speech act theory has the reverse
effect, perhaps as a result of the uniqueness of the specific intent element
of the crime of genocide. While references to causation in the ICG judg-
ments of the ICTR Trial Chamber have compendiously widened the scope
of utterances that would qualify as ICG, speech act theory appears to nar-
row the aperture, for the reasons given.
V. SPEECH AND CAUSATION IN COMPLETED CRIMES
Thus far, I have sought to demonstrate the relevance of J.L. Austin’s
speech act theory for international courts tasked with determining
whether the crime of ICG has occurred. I have argued that an interna-
tional court can find evidence of specific intent in the locutionary and il-
locutionary aspects of the utterances of the accused, and not in their
consequences. This shift in emphasis has a number of ramifications, the
first being that it augurs a move towards prevention—and the possible
emergence of international criminal tribunals as a mechanism for proscrib-
ing early calls for genocide by political leaders, and thereby standing a
better chance of preventing humanitarian catastrophes.
If we accept the clarifications given in this Article regarding causation,
then we need to consider situations where an individual encourages an
audience to commit genocide and then the crime of genocide actually oc-
curs, and also where prosecutors possess clear and compelling evidence
that certain speech acts led to specific criminal acts that may amount to
genocide. My recommendation is that prosecutors and judges refrain from
attempting to smuggle the perlocutionary aspects of speech acts into the
category of ICG, and instead turn to the forms of criminal liability already
in usage in international criminal law and which are more appropriate for
crimes that are attempted or consummated. I refer specifically to aiding
and abetting, inducing, instigating, ordering, and soliciting.192 While these
terms have illocutionary aspects according to Austin’s speech act theory,
in international law there is no dispute that each of these modes of liability
requires that the crime be completed or attempted. This requirement dis-
tinguishes these crimes unmistakably from ICG. Article 25 of the 1998
derstood by the listener. Perlocutions entail responses, that is, being convinced, taking alarm,
and in Austin’s view, mostly the undertaking of non-verbal physical actions.
191. See Greenawalt, supra note 142; Langton, supra note 141.
192. International criminal law defines and differentiates planning, instigating, order-
ing, and aiding and abetting in a number of places, including the Brdanin Trial Judgment.
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Br–danin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 267–74 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004). The literature on international criminal law’s
“modes of liability” is vast, and one might start with chapters 9–11 of Antonio Cassese’s
International Criminal Law. See CASSESSE & GAETA supra note 58, at 161–205.
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which addresses indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, states:
3. . . . [A] person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person:. . .
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime
which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission.193
Note the reference to “a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted.”
In each instance, the assistance, support, command, encouragement, or so-
licitation must have a perlocutionary aspect: that is, an effect on the com-
mission of the offense commensurate with the mode of liability charged.194
Where genocide is in fact carried out, or a serious attempt is made to com-
mit genocide, a range of modes of liability may apply—running the gamut
from high to low levels of criminal responsibility.195
At the higher level, there is “ordering,” in which a de facto or de jure
superior issues a written or verbal command to a subordinate to commit a
criminal offense, when that superior is in position of superior (or com-
mand) responsibility within a military or political hierarchy or organiza-
tion.196 Ordering pertains to instigating speech acts by a political or
military leader that had foreseeable effects on the actions of his or her
followers and subordinates, motivating them to commit prohibited acts.
At the lowest level of criminal responsibility in international criminal
law, we have “aiding and abetting,”197 which requires “practical assis-
tance, encouragement or moral support which has a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime.”198 In the last few years, ICTR and ICTY
Appeals Chamber judges have radically reinterpreted the requirements
for this form of liability, leading to a string of acquittals. In 2013, in a
controversial decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment in Perišić
193. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25.3(b)–(c), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
194. See CASSESSE & GAETA supra note 57, at 214.
195. The attentive reader will note that in this Section, I do not include the mode of
liability of joint criminal enterprise on the grounds that, following Schabas’s lead, “the role of
joint criminal enterprise complicity in genocide has to date remained largely theoretical . . .
any genuine utility of joint criminal enterprise in genocide prosecutions remains unproven.”
SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 355.
196. On ordering, see CASSESSE & GAETA supra note 57, at 204–05. See also ROBERT
CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 375
(3rd ed. 2014).
197. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskić (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment, 29 July 2004.
198. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR-5-1-T), Trial Chamber
Judgment, 21 May 1999, §126.
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required for conviction that the aider or abettor share the criminal intent
of the primary perpetrator and provide “specific direction” to the material
perpetrators as an element of the actus reus of the crime.199 While interna-
tional criminal law generally understands aiding and abetting as entailing
practical assistance200 in the commission of the crime, the definition also
includes providing “encouragement or moral support.”201 In this way,
abetting and incitement are conceptually related.
William Schabas understands abetting to be the same as “incitement
when the underlying crime occurs.”202 Schabas cites the Black’s Law Dic-
tionary definition of “abet”—”to encourage, incite, or set another to com-
mit a crime”—and observes that it derives from the old French “à beter,
meaning to bait or excite.”203 In cases where genocide has actually oc-
curred, abetting seems to be the appropriate form of criminal responsibil-
ity to hold accountable radio DJs, journalists, and other propagandists
who do not occupy a position of superior responsibility within a political
or military hierarchy. Implicitly, this was the type of criminal responsibility
favored by the prosecution and judges in Streicher, and there are good
reasons to follow it.
Positioned midway between aiding and abetting and ordering on the
continuum of responsibility, there is instigation, which is commonly
glossed as “prompting another to commit an offense” and which again is
conceptually adjacent to incitement.204 Indeed, in U.S. criminal law, insti-
gation and incitement are routinely equated and subsumed under the
wider crime of “solicitation.”205 By creating two distinct categories, inter-
national tribunals have differentiated incitement from instigation, defining
the former as a direct and public inciting speech act, whereas the latter
may take many forms (that is, not only speech) and may be expressed or
199. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment on Appeal (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). On “specific direction” as a necessary element of
the actus reus of aiding and abetting, see id. §2(a). US law regarding the mens rea of accom-
plice liability requires the accomplice to share the criminal intent of the principal in a “com-
munity of purpose” in the unlawful undertaking. JOSHUA DRESSLER, supra note 180, at 480
(5th ed. 2009) (quoting State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188, 189 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974)).
200. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶ 137 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
201. See Prosecutor v. Br–danin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004).
202. SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 324–25.
203. Id. at 325.
204. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶
480 (Nov. 28, 2007) (“The actus reus of instigating implies prompting another person to com-
mit an offense.”).
205. In the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of the crime
of solicitation if “he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in conduct
which would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would establish his
complicity in its commission or attempted commission.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1)
(1985).
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implied, private or public.206 In all cases, the instigation must have sub-
stantially contributed to the physical element of the crime, and the
Br–danin Trial Judgment demands that “[t]he nexus between instigation
and perpetration requires proof.”207 Causality is a central element of insti-
gation; the ICTY Trial Chamber in Blaskić stated that “[t]he essence of
instigating is that the accused causes another person to commit a
crime.”208 At the ICTY, in the trial of Vojislav Šešelj, the Serb nationalist
leader is charged with instigating actual crimes against humanity on the
basis of three speeches he gave during the 1991–95 armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.209
Even though there are clear grounds upon which to separate inchoate
speech crimes such as incitement from modes of criminal liability such as
instigating, the genocide case law of the ICTR has unfortunately conflated
incitement and instigation. Wibke K. Timmerman points out this confu-
sion, noting that incitement is defined in terms of instigation in two cases
at the ICTR: the Trial Chamber in Rutaganda and Musema opined that
“incitement . . . involves instigating another, directly and publicly, to com-
mit an offense.”210 This statement is misguided in many ways, not least
because instigation is not a crime but rather a form of responsibility for
manifold different crimes, whereas ICG is a crime in and of itself.211 Re-
sponding to this confusion, Timmerman recalls that German and Swiss do-
mestic legal doctrine sharply differentiate incitement and instigation. Both
define incitement as an inchoate crime and instigation as a mode of liabil-
ity for crimes that are attempted or completed.212
To be clear: while I have sought to clarify the confusion on causation
for the inchoate crime of ICG, causation is absolutely necessary for the
206. In distinguishing between instigation as a mode of liability and incitement as an
inchoate crime, ICTR judges declared in Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T,
Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 20, 2009) (“Instigation under Article 6 (1) is a mode of liability; an
accused will incur criminal responsibility only if the instigation in fact substantially contrib-
uted to the commission of one of the crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. By contrast,
direct and public incitement is itself a crime, requiring no demonstration that it in fact con-
tributed in any way to the commission of acts of genocide.”).
207. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 269. For more on instigation in inter-
national criminal law, see ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 379-80 (2d ed. 2010).
208. Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 270 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
209. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Third Amended Indictment, ¶ 5 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007).
210. Timmerman, Incitement, supra note 10, at 840 (referencing Prosecutor v. Ruta-
ganda, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment, ¶ 38 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Jan. 27, 2000)).
211. The ICTR Trial Chamber in Kalimanzira states that, “Instigation under Article
6(1) is a mode of liability . . . By contrast, direct and public incitement is itself a crime. . . .”
Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 22, 2009).
212. Timmerman, Incitement, supra note 10, at 848–50.
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modes of liability for consummated crimes.213 Of course, the devil is in the
details, and I do not presume that it is a straightforward matter to connect
an inciting speech act to a criminal offense in any actual criminal case
before an international criminal tribunal. Criminal causation has been de-
fined in centuries of case law and jurisprudence, and genocide convictions
for speech acts using a “completion” mode of liability (aiding, inducing,
instigating, ordering, soliciting) must satisfy the standard conventions of
criminal law and prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. Austin argues
that for a speech act to be successful, the speaker must secure the “up-
take” of the audience—wherein the audience members comprehend what
the speaker is urging or ordering them to do, and are successfully per-
suaded to act to achieve the speaker’s intended goal.214 To function as
intended, a speech act must go beyond the locutionary and illocutionary
aspects and have demonstrable perlocutionary effects. Whether this occurs
depends upon context and convention, requiring “the uttering of certain
words by certain persons in certain circumstances.”215 Langton correctly
observes that “the context determines the uptake secured.”216
Recently, scholars have constructed tests and frameworks for deter-
mining the significance of contextual factors in speech crimes cases, and
these are relevant to our understanding of completed crimes. ICTY prose-
cutor Predrag Dojčinović agrees that the existing model of international
criminal law is inadequate for evaluating speech acts and he identifies the
conditions of satisfaction under which speech acts have perlocutions, or
concrete effects, and reviews the kind of evidence that might be consid-
ered to demonstrate such effects.217 Drawing from recent studies in cogni-
tive linguistics and the work of John Searle, Dojčinović develops a highly
innovative model in which some instigating speakers have a unique
“mental fingerprint”218 that can be documented to demonstrate a link be-
tween the instigator and the instigated.219 This concept refers to a unique
phrase that is coined and used by the accused in his or her speech. Dojči-
nović illustrates his theory with the example of Serb nationalist politician
Vojislav Šešelj, who coined the term the “Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlkovac-
Virovitica line”—indicating the boundary of Serb lands in Croatia. Each
213. Where speech crimes are alleged, prosecutors may indict either the inchoate crime
(ICG) or the consummated crime (e.g., instigating genocide), but not both simultaneously.
Citing the US Model Penal Code, Cahill observes that most criminal codes “prohibit imposi-
tion of liability for both an inchoate crime and the target offense of that crime.” Cahill, supra
note 137, at 753.
214. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 117–18.
215. Id. at 14. Austin uses the naming of a ship as an example, and explains that the
person naming a ship must be authorized to do so. He illustrates this by reflecting that if he
himself walked idly by a ship and named it the “Mr. Stalin,” it would be an ineffective speech
act, since it was not uttered by the right person in the right circumstances. Id. at 23.
216. Langton, supra note 141, at 301.
217. Dojčinović, supra note 144, at 71.
218. See id., at 95–96 for a discussion of the “mental fingerprint” concept.
219. Id. at 95.
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time military or paramilitary actors used such extreme nationalist concepts
as justification for their criminal violations, Dojčinović writes, their mental
state was cognitively “fingerprinted,” potentially constituting evidence of
mental causation and shared criminal intent. This creates, says Dojčinović
an “evidentiary feedback loop as one of the links between the instigator
and the instigated.”220 There is some evidence that Nuremberg prosecu-
tors adopted something akin to a “mental fingerprint” approach in the
trial brief they prepared to argue for Julius Streicher’s criminal liability,
noting that “three speeches given by Streicher ‘gave birth to the watch-
word which, 14 years later, was to become the official policy of the Nazi
Government—the Annihilation of the Jews.’ These speeches were: (1) in
Nurnberg, 23 Nov. 1932, (2) in the Bavarian Diet, 20 Nov. 1924, and (3) in
Nurnberg, 3 April 1925.”221 There is unfortunately not enough space here
to evaluate further these possible avenues of investigation and potential
legal innovation, and here I can say only that I am open to these models in
cases of completion liability such as instigation, but not in relation to ICG.
A second caveat is that if causation is going to play a crucial role in
completion modes of criminal liability related to speech acts, then the
threshold of proof for speech crimes ought to be clarified more rigorously
than it is presently. International criminal law would greatly benefit from a
much clearer and fuller judicial explanation of the degree of causation that
could demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a nexus exists between
the originating speech act and a criminal outcome. This will require resolv-
ing the gray areas of uncertainty that exist in international jurisprudence,
and answering the as yet unanswered question—what is the degree of cer-
tainty necessary for a court to determine that a speech act has actually
caused a criminal offense?
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the ICTR has adopted a confusing
approach to causation in its jurisprudence on direct and public incitement
to commit genocide. Causation is, however, essential for modes of liability
such as aiding and abetting, instigation, and ordering, which require that
the underlying crime (in this case, genocide) be attempted or completed. I
have provided a number of arguments for why the prevailing international
criminal law of ICG is problematic, and sought to clarify matters via a
novel argument using Austin’s ordinary language philosophy. Performa-
tive speech acts are acts, and they can be evaluated according to what they
mean, what they encourage others to do, and what consequences they
have. In what they mean and what they urge, speech acts can be consid-
ered criminal acts in and of themselves. This approach also has the advan-
tage of tracking the statutory basis of the International Criminal Court:
220. Id. at 95.
221. Thomas J. Dodd, Trial Brief Concerning Streicher, University of Connecticut:
Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center, available at http://
archives.lib.uconn.edu/islandora/object/20002%3A1943#page/1/mode/2up.
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Article 25, defining “Individual Criminal Responsibility,” does not require
causation or completion for ICG. Yet it does require that all other crimes
listed in the Rome Statute actually occur or be attempted when criminal
responsibility rests upon ordering, soliciting, or inducing the crime.
If we accept that the current prevailing law of ICG is ambiguous and
needs to be clarified, then this might be accomplished in various ways.
Thus far, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has not reviewed the relevance of
causation for ICG directly, and since the Tribunal will soon complete its
work, that potential avenue is likely closed. The ICTY, however, is still
hearing cases that involve international speech crimes: Bosnian Serb polit-
ical leader Radovan Karadžić is charged with having instigated, ordered
and aided and abetted genocide against a part of the Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat national, ethnic, and religious groups. Serb leader Vojislav
Šešelj faces charges of having ordered, instigated and aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of Croat, Muslim
and other non-Serb civilian populations. The International Criminal Court
has issued warrants in several of its early cases, notably Ahmad Harun of
the Sudan and Joshua Arap Sang of Kenya, charging defendants with in-
ducing, ordering, co-perpetrating or abetting war crimes and crimes
against humanity on the basis of speeches and radio broadcasts.
Finally, the problems in the international law of ICG seem to have
sprung from the International Law Commission’s 1996 criminal code for
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Perhaps it falls to the ILC to
reaffirm incitement as an inchoate crime and clarify how causation is rele-
vant to speech acts that result in attempted or completed crimes. This
would not be such a severe blow to the legitimacy of the International Law
Commission—and over time might even enhance its authority, especially
if we recall that historically, international criminal law has been con-
structed from a patchwork of international declarations and decisions
drawn from a variety of national and international legal settings. If the
international criminal law of ICG is to sharpen and cohere over time, it
will no doubt do so in a piecemeal way, through future decisions handed
down by international courts such as the International Criminal Court, as
well as national criminal courts.
